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Introduction 
The construction industry is often criticized for its inability to innovate, to 
improve its practices and to provide value for its clients (Egan, 1998).  
 To fulfil the expectations of demanding clients, new project-delivery con-
figurations have been developed. Approaches focusing on performance-
based building or new procurement process such as new forms of private-
public partnerships are considered as solutions improving the overall 
performance of the industry. 
 The main objective of this project has been to understand how the 
development of integrated solutions in construction led to distinct 
configuration of actors and structures. Furthermore, the project analyses 
whether these changes modified project processes and contributed to the 
delivery of new value to the end users. 
 In this report we argue that an understanding of the coupling between 
new values for clients and new project-delivery configurations can benefit 
from including the notation of Complex Products and Systems (CoPS) to 
weight the systemic and contextual factors in which the formation and 
stabilization of the coupling between values and new project-delivery 
methods takes place. 
Purpose of the study 
According to Goodier et al. (2008: 109), there is an increasing move away 
from product delivery towards delivery to satisfy clients' needs through 
service provision. This shift, which is argued to be well established in sectors 
such as aerospace, defence and manufacturing procurement, is now 
becoming more important in the construction industry as well – a statement 
to which the proliferation of e.g. PPP/PFI schemes in most European 
countries bears witness. This move has also been the target of the 
European Union, which in the Lead Market Initiative for Europe seeks 
among other things to promote sustainable solutions in building and 
construction works, and to help foster market uptake of innovative products 
and services by means of improved public procurement practices.  
 The move towards sustainable solutions and service provision in 
construction is not, however, a straightforward task. As is argued by the 
European Commission (EC, 2010): 
"The plethora and mismatch of building regulations at EU and national 
levels leads to considerable administrative burdens and - given that the 
business structure is predominantly local - to a very fragmented 
sustainable construction market." (EC, 2010).  
Furthermore it is argued that, although many technical solutions are already 
available, demand remains highly fragmented. Despite the fact that 40% of 
demand for construction works comes from the public sector, decision-
makers are said to be unaware of the scope for adopting so-called 
innovation-oriented solutions. This ignorance is the result of a perceived lack 
of knowledge on possibilities for procurement that could facilitate demand for 
innovation-oriented solutions (EC, 2010). 
 To address and redress this issue, the POCOPSC project consortium has 
set out to examine this “…increasing move away from product delivery to-
wards the delivery of clients' needs through service provision” (Goodier et al. 
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2006: 109) and the development of integrated solutions (Brady et al., 2005) 
in construction. In doing so, the project consortium has analysed how 
complex products and systems (CoPS) are procured and operated in Danish 
and French construction business systems.  
 To meet this goal, three inter-related issues in the study of different 
project delivery forms have been scrutinised in the project. These are:  
 
1 How new types of partnerships develop new innovation structures and 
what impact this has on the construction sector.  
 
New configurations of partnerships in the construction sector occur as part of 
the innovation by the sector itself in its transition to social agendas such as 
energy and climate-adapted building etc. This addresses the issue on where 
and how different configurations of various public-private partnerships come 
into being in the construction sector, how new innovative structures are 
taken into use in construction projects and what types of feedback 
processes that have been established as part of the innovation. 
 
2 How (and which) governance mechanisms are put in place to deal with 
the new project delivery processes and procurement procedures.   
 
New configurations will require new governance mechanisms, considering 
traditional contractual control as well as relational coherence (Clegg et al., 
2002). As e.g. Teubner (2006: 51) argues, today we face a “contractual gap” 
in that the contract can no longer be seen as "the consensual exchange 
relation of two legal subjects to which the judge grants legal force.” Rather, 
the contract should be understood as a polycontextual relation that 
simultaneously has to address legal, economic and productive acts in 
accordance with the intrinsic logic of the specific context. Thus, to reduce 
hazards of opportunism and deploy safeguards for every possible future 
contingency, formal control based on detailed and complex contracts is 
insufficient as the contract can never stipulate every potential contingency. 
Conversely, the relational perspective focuses on the role of trust and 
promotes solidarity and information exchange. 
 
3 How changes in public and private procurement procedures are reflected 
in performance processes and delivering new value to the end users. 
 
Any way of working, from traditional turn-key contracting to crafts-based 
project delivery, requires a distinct configuration of actors and structures 
(institutional and regulatory) that is inscribed with a certain value-rationality; 
a certain quality of project delivery that is seen as more or less valuable than 
alternatives made possible by other configurations. In terms of value, the 
construction industry has been dominated by cost issues for many years. 
But recent changes in public and private procurements are modifying 
performance processes and bringing new value to the end users. 
Theoretical approach 
In the design of our theoretical framework, we draw on two fields of research 
that address the various relations between actors in the construction sector.  
 Both CoPS studies and the STS approach (Science and Technology 
Studies) elaborate 1) the project-based nature of the construction sector 
theoretically and empirically 2) the importance of relationships between 
companies that provide complex products, and 3) the interplay between the 
project and the infrastructure surrounding the project such as legislation, 
institutions, research, etc. The two research approaches pursue divergent 
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objectives, as reflected in divergent research agendas. The CoPS approach 
is primarily business-oriented and aims to enhance the quality of project-
based companies’ innovation processes. The STS approach is a critical and 
alternative perspective of the perception of technological development as 
deterministic, and it aims to enhance the understanding of technology 
development as a social process by showing how technical objects and 
social relations are bonded together and how actors and technology are co-
produced (Bijker, 1995; Harty, 2005). 
 Several business sectors are concerned with CoPS. "CoPS are defined 
as high-cost, engineering-intensive products, systems, networks and 
constructs" (Hobday, 1998: 690). The aims are to understand CoPS as an 
analytical category and how CoPS as an analytical category can be applied 
in construction. STS is used as a critical and constructive perspective to 
strengthen the analysis.  
Readers guideline 
The report is structured in four major parts. Part one introduces the main 
characteristics of CoPS and methodological foundations and implications. 
Part two addresses three separate themes that each highlights different 
aspects of CoPS: 1) Innovation in CoPS, 2) Governance issues in CoPS and 
3) Measuring performance in CoPS, Each theme relates to one research 
question and is the starting point for the development of analytical focus 
points. Part three is the case section. In the case section six cases are 
included, three Danish cases and three French cases. The cases illustrate 
how CoPS are procured and operated within Danish and French 
construction business systems and illustrate different public-private 
partnerships and integrated solutions. The case studies concern private as 
well as public projects, where the client is also the building user. Different 
configurations have been explored such as ESCO, conventional 
procurement based on performance criteria, partnership between a public 
client and a building component supplier, and PPP. The French cases focus 
mainly on PPP projects due to the growing interest of these procurement 
systems since 2004. 
 Since improving building energy performance is perceived as a central 
part of the solution to climate change in the EU, and since different 
strategies at EU level as well as at national level have been developed to 
cope with the challenges, this aspect influences all the cases in different 
ways. Energy strategies reflected in EU directives and the various national 
Building Regulations have changed character, reflecting differences in the 
understanding of the problem and possible solutions, relevant actors and 
governance structures. Overall, one can describe the evolution as a shift 
from prescriptive regulation to performance-based regulation. Each case 
addresses with this challenge in different ways. Part four is the concluding 
section. The findings in the six cases are summarized schematically followed 
by a discussion structured by the three research questions. 
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CoPS as an analytical category  
The focus on CoPS is motivated by the fact that in the academic literature 
CoPS constitutes a relatively well-grounded perspective on the systemic 
character of innovation in construction. As Harty argues: 
“A growing literature on complex products and systems […] initially 
looks interesting for those interested in construction organization, and 
it reveals a mismatch between a high amount of innovation and 
learning at a project level, where many novel problems are 
encountered and solved, and the capture and translation of this into a 
reusable organizational resource.” (Harty, 2005: 514).  
Harty (2005) argues that the literature “initially” looks interesting and this has 
much to do with (i) the rather weak conceptualisation of how to bridge the 
gap between firm and project; and (ii) that most CoPS cases are confined 
within a single organisation and do not consider cases of inter-firm 
collaboration in which ownership and control of activities are not clearly 
delineated.  
 This problem of weak conceptualisation of the mechanisms at play in the 
intersection between project and firm, in specificity and heterogeneous enti-
ties in general, is not just a problem in the CoPS literature. We also 
encounter this issue in the related area of innovation systems study. As 
Broström (2008) has argued 
 “…the approach [systems of innovation approach] has remained a 
general framework rather than evolved into an analytical tool for the 
study of the dynamics of innovation activities.” (Broström, 2008: 1).  
Before addressing the wider analytical and methodological issues in the 
study of CoPS, we will briefly highlight the main characteristics of CoPS 
when observed as an analytical framework. 
CoPS as an analytical category 
In the following, we will start our elaboration of CoPS as an analytical cate-
gory by referring to the seminal work undertaken by the Complex Product 
Systems Innovation Centre (cf. Hobday, 1996; 1998a; Barlow, 2000).  
Level of analysis: Complex product systems  
Using CoPS as the analytical category in the study of construction activities 
places special emphasis on: 
"…the elaborate nature of organisational dynamics [that] arises from 
the temporary nature of the inter-firm coalitions involved in the 
production of CoPS projects." (Barlow, 2000: 974).  
Before commencing the discussion of the essence and implications of this 
”elaborate nature of organisational dynamics”, let us briefly review the 
defining characteristics of CoPS as argued by e.g. Barlow (2000) and Hob-
day (1998; 2000a). 
 First, the definition, which is the primary point-of-entry in discussions on 
CoPS: 
"CoPS are defined as high cost, engineering-intensive products, sys-
tems, networks and constructs" (Hobday, 1998: 690).  
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Sharpening this definition, the simplest way of illustrating the defining char-
acteristics of CoPS is, according to Hobday (2000a: 794), to distinguish 
them from mass-produced goods. Thus, it is argued, there are at least three 
significant differences between CoPS and mass-produced goods:  
1 CoPS are composed of many customised, interconnected elements, 
including control units, sub-systems and components. These are organ-
ised in a hierarchical manner and tailored for specific customers and/or 
markets.  
2 CoPS tend to exhibit emergent properties during production, as unpre-
dictable and unexpected events and interactions often occur during de-
sign, systems engineering and integration. 
3 CoPS tend to be produced in projects or in small batches which allow for 
a high degree of direct user involvement, enabling business users to 
engage directly in the innovation process. 
 
Further, Barlow (2000: 974) argues that "The integration of a wide variety of 
knowledge and skills, and mastery of complex subsystems interfaces, are all 
crucial to the design and development of CoPS projects" and that: 
– It is not usually possible to test full-scale prototypes in CoPS projects, 
making simulation and modelling of great importance in front-end deci-
sion making, planning and execution. 
– The importance of tacit knowledge and need for personal contact in 
problem solving places emphasis on continuous and contiguous project 
participation in the successful delivery of CoPS projects (Ibid., 2000). 
 
As such, and at first glance, this might sound very much like the characteris-
tics of the everyday large-scale construction project that very much is taken 
for granted within the construction management research area. 
 When this, however, is argued not to be the case, it rests primarily on the 
technology scope. Thus, even though the units of analysis of CoPS are (i) 
the project and (ii) its output, the creed “a project is a project is a project” 
does not hold true (Hobday, 1996: 1). Rather, with a somewhat circular 
argument, Hobday argued that complex product systems projects can be 
viewed as a specific sub-set of projects concerned with the development, 
manufacture and delivery of complex product systems. 
 Using the figure below on the scope of complex product systems, Hobday 
(1996: 2) argued that CoPS include all the high technology, high cost, 
complex, networks, infrastructural and engineering goods contained in 
categories A and B. At the same time it is stressed that some low technology 
systems (such as roadworks and simple building constructs) would not be 
included.  
 
 
Figure 1. The scope of complex product systems (Hobday, 1996: 2).  
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This figure cannot stand alone, however. Hobday (1996: 3) thus argued that 
the classification “…lacks any sense of the nature of the “product” or its 
technological novelty and uncertainty.” The reason for Hobday to stress this 
very aspect is arguably that he is speaking specifically from the point of 
innovation (and innovation management) theory, which hitherto had 
predominantly developed on the basis of studies of mass-production. Thus, 
in order to outline a new research agenda for a type of industrial output 
(being characterised exactly in terms of its task, technological 
uncertainty/novelty and complexity) that is increasingly of importance to the 
modern economy, a clearer delineation of these features is required.   
 Such a conceptualisation is offered by Shenhar (1994), who provided the 
following model illustrated in figure 2 below (cf. Shenhar (2001: 397-401) for 
a detailed description and explanation of the model).  
 
Figure 2. Two key dimensions of projects and products (Hobday, 1996: 2; Shenhar, 2001: 401).  
According to this classification, Hobday (1996) argues that a CoPS would be 
located in groups C2, C3, D2 and D3, with a possible overlap with groups B2 
and B3. Let us therefore look closer in at the dimensions and properties of 
these groups. 
System boundaries: Technology 
Technological uncertainty is associated with the degree of “…using new (to 
the company) versus mature technology within the product or process 
produced” (Shenhar, 2001: 397). Hobday (1996), on the other hand, 
removed the company from the equation. Thus, in shifting focus from the 
“firm” to the project and its output, Hobday operated with a rather non-
situated technology perspective in which technological uncertainty at the 
level of the situated actor is replaced for technological novelty understood at 
a most generalised “industry” level in terms of R&D intensity.  
System boundaries: Complexity 
Second, system scope designates “…the physical nature of the product and, 
in particular, the degree of hierarchy within a product or system” (Hobday, 
1996: 3). According to Shenhar (2001), system scope constitutes the 
complexity dimension of the framework.  
 Complexity is mainly seen from a technical angle by Hobday. However, 
complexity also encompasses financial and legal elements and varies 
according to contracting authorities. 
 According to the European Commission, “a public contract is considered 
to be particularly complex where the contracting authorities: 
– are not objectively able to define the technical means in accordance with 
Article 23(3)(b), (c) or (d), capable of satisfying their needs or objectives, 
and/or 
– are not objectively able to specify the legal and/or financial make‑up of a 
project.” 
 
This financial complexity can be linked to “projects involving complex and 
structured financing the financial and legal make-up of which cannot be 
defined in advance.” (European Commission, 2005) 
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 Moreover, the capacity of the contracting authority has to be taken into 
account to justify the use of the competitive dialogue. According to Williams 
(1999), this complexity refers to uncertainty. Indeed, project complexity is 
characterised by two dimensions: structural complexity and uncertainty. 
Structural complexity (Baccarini, 1996) refers to the number of subsystems 
of a product / the number of specialties and their inter-relationships. 
Interdependencies intensify complexity since a change in one element will 
have an impact on the subsystem. Uncertainty can also be classified 
according two dimensions: the uncertainty in goals is linked to the difficulty 
of the users / clients to specify their requirements. This increases the risks of 
changes (i.e re-work). The uncertainty in methods is more due to a lack of 
experience on a similar project which requires modifying and refining the 
methods during the course of the project. For example, complexity will be 
stronger for small municipalities than for large one who can rely on 
specialized internal departments. 
 Originally, Hobday (1998), drawing on Shenhar (1994; 2001) operated 
with three levels of complexity: (i) assembly projects, (ii) system projects and 
(iii) array projects, where CoPS would fall into the system and array 
categories. Whereas an assembly was defined as a collection of parts 
formed into a single unit performing a limited function, a system should be 
seen as a more complex collection of interactive components within the 
boundaries of a single product, which perform a task. Finally, an array would 
be a very large, complex collection of systems, which act in unison to 
achieve a common goal. As such, Hobday (1996) argued that an array 
“…would provide a major input to the formation of a large technical system 
as defined by Hughes (1983).” (Hobday, 1996: 4). 
 The boundaries between CoPS and LTS (large technical systems), 
however, are not entirely clear from this delimitation alone. In an extended 
version of his previous papers (Hobday, 1996; 1998a), Hobday (1998b) 
therefore elaborated the two-dimensional framework accordingly (Figure 3 
below):   
 
Figure 3. Two key dimensions of projects and products (Hobday, 1998b: 4).  
Drawing explicitly on Hughes (1983), arrays are now abandoned as units or 
arenas of investigation in the analysis of innovation in CoPS on account of 
their evolutionary nature. As Hobday (1998b: 6) argued:    
“Also, arrays comprised of combinations of systems would mostly be 
excluded from the definition, unless they were supplied under one 
definable project.”  
Eventually, Hobday et al. (2005) replaced the notion of “array” with “large 
technical system” in describing their simple typology of technological 
systems, thus stressing the point that CoPS, in contrast to LTS, are 
centripetal rather than centrifugal and are endowed with certain ex-ante 
rather than ex-post qualities (cf. Geyer and Davis, 2000). 
 Further, from a perspective of systems integration, defined as the 
capabilities which enable various actors to define and combine together all 
the necessary input for a system (Hobday et al., 2005: 1110), assemblies 
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and to some extent components can also be excluded from scrutiny on 
account of their non-project-based nature.  
 In the case of assemblies, systems integration is argued to take place: 
“…at the individual supplier firm level and is a fairly simple manufacturing 
process…” (Hobday et al., 2005: 1113). In the case of components, or sub-
systems, systems integration takes place:”…usually within a single firm and 
involves a highly complex process with many different steps…” (Ibid., 2005: 
1113).   
 Thus, when speaking in the context of complexity, the defining 
characteristic of a CoPS, is its project-based nature; i.e. that it is delivered 
according to a “projective” integration method. This, according to 
Christensen and Kreiner (1991), entails that: 
– New goals are continuously defined  
– Coordination is designed specifically for each project, i.e. coordination 
(mechanisms) varies from project to project 
– Success depends on the achievement of goals in relation to explicitly 
defined expectations. 
 
In the following section, we will review these characteristics in relation to the 
study of CoPS and technological systems. 
Methodological and analytical issues in CoPS 
Based on the above exposition, CoPS can be defined:  
– By their systemic nature  
– By their dual social and technological composition 
– By their mixed temporal characteristics, having both an ex-ante defined 
expiry date and an element of continuousness throughout an ill-defined 
lifetime of operation 
– By their project-specific, situated governance / coordination structure 
– By their actor-negotiated success / performance criteria 
 
In other words, even though the units of analysis in the CoPS literature are 
the project and its output, we argue for a need to refrain from observing 
CoPS as solely a question of innovation management in an industrial 
understanding, and advocate not only a more explicit system focus, but also 
an STS / socio-technical approach to innovation in construction (cf. Harty, 
2005), in order to fully encapsulate and understand the technological 
complexity and the element of distributed agency that are at play in CoPS. 
Technology (both in CoPS (implicitly) and in LTS (explicitly)) is seen as a 
structuring device. We should therefore apply a perspective that is sensitive 
towards understanding the role played in relation to agency. Thus, in order 
to understand the argued shift towards service-based procurement and 
operation, we have to understand the “evolutionary” negotiated perspective 
as well and apply a theoretical / analytical perspective that can also 
encapsulate this dimension. As such, the product has to be seen in relation 
to the larger system or network in which is embedded. 
 The mixed temporal characteristics of CoPS further entail that we have to 
consider a series of issues from a project-specific and as well an operational 
system perspective, as illustrated in the following Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Project-system innovation cycle (Geyers and Davies, 2000: 1009). 
Geyer and Davies (2000) and Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008) introduced 
the notion of ‘large technical system’ in order to use a framework that 
integrates construction and operation phases.  
“Both sides – the project and the operational systems – influence and 
shape each other, creating a dynamic that stimulates innovative 
behavior, forming a project-system innovation cycle” (Barlow and 
Köberle-Gaiser, 2008: 1394). 
Delivering CoPS projects requires the combination of project management 
capabilities (managing uncertainty and changes in user specifications) and 
systems integration capabilities. Thus, coordination mechanisms between 
the stakeholders of the construction value added-chain are critical factors for 
the success of service delivery. Coordination between construction and 
operation appears essential not only for successful innovation but also for 
the service quality delivered to the user. Moreover, there is also a necessity 
to integrate the complexity of the operational system and to examine the 
interface between the users of the building and service suppliers.  
 Thus, according to Geyer & Davies (2000) we should not confine 
ourselves to studying just the project, and the project’s success criteria, but 
also the operational system in which the “continuousness” of the CoPS is 
unfolding. This intermingling of “temporary” and “permanent” characteristics 
also has repercussions for how we should observe and understand the shift 
in the nature of the multifarious mechanisms set in place to govern the 
various transactions between project-system participants. With this we mean 
that the increasing involvement of project-based suppliers in the operation of 
the CoPS, and the increasing involvement of operators and feedback of 
operational data in the design of the CoPS, set constraints for traditional 
ways of conducting business and open up for the need for new governance 
mechanisms and performance schemes to handle the new complexities that 
result from the very intermingling of interests and the hybridization of 
organisational forms and project-delivery mechanisms. The cases we have 
chosen to work with all reflect (to varying degree) these concerns. In the 
next section, we will briefly discuss the different cases, and the criteria for 
their selection.  
Case study selection 
Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that it is appropriate to conduct case study 
research when little is known about a phenomenon. So far, hardly any 
studies have examined CoPS in operation. Given the limited existent 
literature, a case study approach appeared relevant. It can provide a critical 
insight in this area where there is a lack of empirical analysis. The selection 
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of case study is also one of the most important issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Tellis, 1997). Gibbert and al. (2008, p.1468) ask researchers to “provide a 
clear rationale for the case study selection”.  
 As a case selection method, we have chosen to use Hobday’s (1998, 
691) framework consisting of “…many of the critical factors which define the 
character of a product and its ‘complexity’, along a range of dimensions 
independent of particular sectors or industries. These dimensions, which 
together provide a rough approximation of product complexity, help 
conceptualise how various aspects of complexity relate to innovation.” 
(Hobday, 1998, 693).  
 Thus, the critical product dimensions that Hobday (1998) has identified 
(see Figure 5 below) can be seen as proxies or indicators of complexity and 
they provide a selection of so-called product features which directly 
contribute to difficulties of managing production and innovation by adding 
uncertainty and risk (Hobday, 1998: 693).  
 
 
Figure 5. Some critical product dimensions of CoPS (adapted after Hobday, 1998: 691). ‘1’ is very low 
complexity and ‘5’is very high complexity. 
Determining the complexity of a given CoPS is an axiological problem. As 
Hobday (1998: 693) explains: “Although the scales are somewhat arbitrary 
and some rely on the subjective judgement, they do help illustrate the range 
of factors involved.” Furthermore, Hobday also argues that the terms 
‘complex’ and ‘complexity’ is used as shorthand to describe the combined 
effect of several different critical product dimensions. While the critical 
product dimensions according to Hobday should be seen as being 
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independent of particular sectors or industries, we argue that it is necessary 
to assess the degree of complexity relative to the relative to particular 
sectors or industries in order to avoid absolutist perceptions of the nature of 
CoPS and at the same time acknowledge the role of the sociotechnical 
system in which they (CoPS) are embedded (Geyer and Davies, 2009). This, 
however, also corresponds with Hobday’s observation (although from an 
economic perspective) that it is “…wise to view CoPS in relation to the 
market in which they are embedded, as the quality of their attributes can 
only be understood in the light of the demands of the marketplace [as] 
market structure […] and exigencies of regulation and user involvement will 
shape many of the parameters and choice within a particular context.” 
(Hobday, 1998: 694). 
 Using the above Figure 5 to develop a ‘product profile’ of a particular 
CoPS a heavy bias towards the right hand side of the figure indicates a 
CoPS of very high coordination complexity and risk whereas a scoring 
towards the left hand side “…might indicate a batch produced stand-alone 
system with relatively little technological novelty and low risk.” (Hobday, 
1998: 696). However, according to Hobday even such low risk and 
technologically ‘trivial’ systems are likely to impose more innovation 
coordination difficulties than mass produced goods. As such, a CoPS would 
generally tend to exhibit higher scores against most of the critical 
dimensions in Figure 5 than mass produced goods based on standard 
components. In particular, a CoPS would have more customised 
components, a greater number of suppliers, more regulatory constraints and 
a larger variety of knowledge and skill inputs than found in simpler goods.   
 Thus, a CoPS is not necessarily complex on all critical product dimension; 
it is however in average more complex (skewed towards the right hand side 
of Figure 5) than mass produced goods. In this study we have had an 
interest in working with a variety of different configurations of complexity 
according to Hobday’s critical product dimensions in order to explore and 
find similarities and draw generalisations on the procurement and operation 
of complex products and systems in construction. In addition, we have 
chosen to focus on cases that exhibit additional critical characteristics 
relevant within the scope of the Eacobuild transnational program on 
research and innovation, namely their strong emphasis on users and clients 
and their application of new business models that focus on integration 
between design, production and operation – and not least feedback 
processes between these phases.  
 Thus, in summary the following criteria can be put forward to justify the 
selection of the six cases in the study: 
– Each case represents a complex project. The six cases were chosen 
because they initially had the potential to be a CoPS. In the analysis of 
the six cases, focus was on both the project's development of new 
systems architecture and on the realisation of feedback processes as a 
strategy to optimize the established system design. 
– French cases are all PPP projects since these projects are service-led 
contracts where the output to be delivered is specified (Hoezen and al., 
2010). It also means that the scope of the contract goes further than 
design-and-build and encompasses operation and maintenance. The 
French cases were among the first PPP contracts signed in order to 
gather information on the operation stage. 
– Danish cases are all concerned with different types of partnerships 
between public and private actors.   
– In all cases, public authorities are demanding for packaged product and 
service delivery. 
 
Table 1 shows the six cases and their differences with respect to type of 
partnership, stage of completion and the data material employed.  
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Partnership Case Stage of completion   Data material 
ESPC/ESCO Frederiksberg 
Municipality 
Energy refurbishment 
activities commenced in 2013  
 
Original tender documents 
(with all appendices) 
Interviews with main actors 
Articles (internet) 
18 high schools Contract signed in 2010 Original contract (without 
appendices) 
Presentation/communication 
made by EIFFAGE and 
Region Centre 
Articles (internet) 
Interviews with main actors 
Client 
partnership 
UN City Under construction during 
research project 
Second phase completed and 
in use by end of 2013 
Documentary material  
Interviews 
Site visits 
Student reports 
Client-supplier 
partnership 
Green 
Lighthouse 
In operation Documentations 
Evaluations 
Reports 
Articles (newspaper) 
PPP INSEP In operation since 2009 Original contract 
Presentation/communication 
made by VINCI 
Interviews with main actors 
The police 
station of 
Strasbourg 
In operation since 2002 FM contract 
Reports 
Interviews with main actors 
Table 1. The six cases and their differences with respect to type of partnership 
The structure of each case follows the same scheme: 
– The context  
– The procurement characteristics 
– The complexity of the project 
– Type of contract 
– Organisational structure 
– Monitoring process  
– Results 
– Lessons learned 
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Key themes and research questions 
Innovation in CoPS 
Various forms of integrated solutions and new types of partnerships have 
been apparent as new solutions within the construction sector, and in many 
other sectors, to meet increased demands from the market and regulation, 
and different attempts have been made to examine their impact on 
innovation in the construction sector. This section addresses the way 
“integrated solutions” and “public-private partnerships” are configured in the 
construction sector as part of the innovation by the sector itself in its 
transition to social agendas such as energy and climate-adapted building 
etc. and the impact on the construction sector. 
 In the next three paragraphs, we address three central CoPS notations”) 
to explore how the CoPS approach can be applied in the construction sector 
to explore innovation in the sector. STS is used as a critical and constructive 
perspective to strengthen the analytical focus point.  
Characteristics of innovation in CoPS 
The standard model of innovation, which is used to examine mass 
production industries, is not adapted to CoPS (Winch, 2003). Under this 
traditional model, innovations tend to follow life cycle patterns from birth to 
maturity. Once a dominant standard is selected, innovation becomes 
incremental and large firms take over small one and produce large volumes 
to many customers. 
 The CoPS perspective strengthens the analysis of innovation in the 
construction sector by focusing on complex product systems as an 
alternative to industrial production, but in the application of the CoPS 
approach in construction as an analytical framework, it is necessary to 
consider that a boundary of CoPS does not necessarily follow the boundary 
of a construction project. 
 In the CoPS approach, complex products tend to be produced in projects 
with a high degree of system hierarchy, where the product architectures can 
be extremely elaborate, partly because designs are tailored for specific 
customers (Hobday, 2000: 795). The life cycle of complex products can 
extend over decades:  
“In CoPS, innovation often proceeds long after the delivery of the 
product, as new features are added and systems are upgraded and 
modified (e.g. in IT networks and intelligent buildings)” (Hobday 2000 
p. 795). 
In order to cope with product, technological and organisational complexity, 
companies often search for simplifying mechanisms and strategies such as 
standardization of previously customized components which can allow for 
production learning, cost reduction and new ways of innovation (Hobday, 
2000: 796).  
 Davis (1998) suggests that some CoPS evolve through two phases of 
innovation. The first phase is the development of new systems architecture. 
This phase is strongly influenced by systems suppliers, regulators, standard-
making bodies and large users. The second phase is characterised by 
development of new product generations. New products and components 
are introduced successively, without fundamentally changing the established 
system design (Hobday 2000 796).  
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 The construction industry differs from other sectors by its project-based 
nature. Moreover, the construction industry is regulated by, on the one hand, 
legislation such as Building codes and ICT notices, and on the other hand 
agreements between the parties, such as contractual forms and 
performance specifications, which significantly determine the framework for 
the individual projects. This means firstly that the relationships between the 
institutional level and individual projects in construction are closely 
interwoven and secondly, that an understanding of innovation in construction 
cannot necessarily take its starting point in a sharp separation of the project 
and the institutional level. In other words, the boundary between each 
construction project and the institutional level, in which each construction 
project is embedded, is often a blurred area. 
 Gann & Salter (2000) have provided an analytical framework for 
understanding the construction industry as a business embedded in a 
context of both policy-making (regulatory and institutional framework) and 
knowledge production (technical support infrastructure). However, when it 
comes to identifying CoPS in the construction sector, focus has only been on 
construction projects such as intelligent buildings.   
 From a socio- technical perspective, Rohracher (2001) suggests that an 
approach to understanding the opportunities and constraints to innovation in 
construction is to analyse the building and the actors involved as a socio-
technical system, i.e. to analyse dependencies and conditions, but also 
interests, perspectives and stakeholder interaction. Typical concepts used in 
analysing socio-technical systems are concepts such as critical issues, 
technological style and technological momentum. Rohracher (2001) 
suggests that one can make analyses at two levels: 1) the national and 
regional level and 2) the project level. At the national / regional level, the 
interaction between industry, government and market are weighted together 
with regulation, education, financial instruments etc. At the project level, 
focus will be on each construction project. Rohracher (2001) suggests that 
traditional buildings as technical systems are different from other artefacts 
such as cars, because there is not in the same way a close technical 
relationship between all sub-components, and this reduces the requirement 
for close interaction between the actors. Building systems are therefore 
more loosely coupled systems, being dependent on the interaction between 
actors (architects, planners, consultants, contractors, building services, etc.) 
who, when setting up a project, will be wired up to the project until it is over 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
 To understand transitions from one system to another, Geels (2004) have 
introduced the multi-level perspective (MLP) that operates with three 
analytical levels: niches, socio-technical regimes and exogenous socio-
technical landscape. The three levels refer to configuration of increasing 
stability. The MLP proposes that: 
“…transitions, which are defined as regime shifts, come about through 
interacting processes within and between these levels. Transitions do 
not come about easily, because existing regimes are characterized by 
lock-in and path dependencies, and oriented towards incremental 
innovation along predictable trajectories” (Geels, 2010: 495).  
Transition management and multiple-level perspectives of innovation focus 
on the ongoing engagement and integration of stakeholders, creation and 
stabilisation of supply chains, standardization of components, articulation of 
practices, and communication of shared goals and understandings (Geels, 
2004). 
 Chris Harty highlights with the notion “unbounded innovations” how 
innovations such as 3 D CAD are taken into use at project and inter-
organisational levels in construction. He distinguishes between bounded and 
unbounded innovations to differentiate between innovations where effects 
and consequences are related within a single organisation or inter-
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organisationally, respectively. He has identified five features that are 
relevant to understand in the construction context into which innovations are 
introduced: “The collaboration upon which construction work is based, its 
organization around particular projects, the centrality of communication to its 
performance, the importance of inter-organizational relations, and the way 
power is distributed” (Harty, 2005: 513).   
 The notion unbounded innovations provides an alternative to the view that 
innovating across projects and between firms is about system integration 
through a single driving force, “an alternative that focuses on the 
mechanisms through which established roles , distinct disciplines, and 
traditional cultures contest and negotiate with and over new technologies or 
new ways of working” (Harty, 2005: 521). 
Systems integrators at the core of the innovation process 
The CoPS perspective strengthens the analysis of innovation in the 
construction sector by focusing on project-based companies’ role as 
systems integrators and the capabilities it requires. However, within the 
application of CoPS in the construction sector, it may be relevant to note that 
it is not necessarily project-based companies that are systems integrators. 
In the CoPS approach, the project-based companies have the privileged role 
as systems integrators and a central research question is how the depth and 
breadth of the capabilities of systems integrators can be measured.  
“Because the span of managerial control may be outside the 
boundaries of a single firm, collaboration is an important element of 
CoPS innovation. To develop new systems, integrators require a deep 
understanding of both the abilities of partner suppliers and the needs 
of demanding professional users, with whom they collaborate during 
innovation and production” (Hobday 2000: 796).  
In contrast to mass production, where module strategies are appropriate 
outsourcing strategies for production companies, the system integrators of 
CoPS have to develop outsourcing strategies that take into account the level 
of architecture, system and complementary knowledge that have to be in-
house.  
 With the current energy demands and future challenges for construction 
for climate adaptation, complexity may well increase. It is often necessary to 
integrate complex products and systems within existing systems in order to 
manage products and systems to function in the context that they form part 
of. Gann and Salter (2000) suggest that the level of technical complexity 
increases when new generations of technology have to integrate with 
existing systems. A need arises for new specialisations that can support 
system integration. The location of the new specialisations can be in 
different parts of companies or between companies; but it is the project-
based companies that position themselves in a role to provide system 
integration services (Gann and Salter, 2000).  
 Weaknesses in allocating the privileged role as systems integrators to 
project-based companies in complex settings such as the built environment 
include poor conceptualization of the institutional level and the construction 
project level, and a blurred relation between these, as well the distributed 
activities within the construction. Whyte and Sexton (2013) stress for 
example the “lack of attention to the diversity of actors involved, these 
actors’ choices and motivations, and their processes involved in taking up 
and using new technologies across heterogeneous networks of practice”. 
Complexity: product, and organisation  
The notation of complexity in CoPS has already been explained deeply in 
part one, why this section only highlights the analytical focus point related to 
innovation.   
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 CoPS are defined by the complexity of the products and focus is on how 
the notion of complexity can be understood and applied beyond the level of 
products to the levels of processes and organisations. 
 CoPS can help to address innovative processes related to complex 
products and services, but in the use of the CoPS approach in construction, 
it may be necessary a priori not to define complexity as a matter of products 
but also as a matter of organisation.   
 The entrance and outcome of innovation in CoPS can also be a 
redefinition of the product (new integrated solutions) in the CoPS project 
organisation (new forms of public-private partnerships). At the same time, 
implementation of new structures has to cope with uncertainty. In a study of 
implementation of new IKT technologies in construction projects Chris Hart 
find that: 
“Technologies are not finalized, fixed objects that can be imposed and 
to which people must adapt, but are malleable and can be transformed 
through contests over the building of systems. Unforeseen 
consequences are also considered, where attempts at alignment can 
result in the exclusion of necessary actors from the system, and trigger 
the assembly of alternate, parallel systems” (Harty; 2006: 521). 
Addressing complexity of the product as well as the organisation as an 
important innovation focus,  both the specific configuration of private-public 
partnerships and integrated solutions become important  categories in the 
analysis; a focus that is absent in CoPS studies.  
Analytical focus points addressing innovation in CoPS in the 
construction sector 
1 What is the boundary of the CoPS, including the interfaces between the 
project and the operational system?  
2 How is the system integrator configured in the specific CoPS? 
3 What is the complexity of each CoPS (innovation focus) and what type of 
feedback processes has been established as part of optimizing the 
CoPS. 
Governance in CoPS 
Hobday (1998b, 2000) introduced the term complex products and systems 
(CoPS) and emphasizes CoPS as the chief unit of analysis for innovation, 
management and competition analysis rather than the single firm. Hobday 
(1998b: 689) argues that the dynamics of innovation in CoPS are likely to 
differ from mass-produced commodity goods due to their distinctive 
characteristics. CoPS are characterised by being highly customised, 
engineering-intensive products, which often require several producers to 
work together simultaneously. Hobday (2000: 691-693) identifies a set of 
indicators of critical factors which defines the complexity of a CoPS. These 
include the quantity of tailored components and sub-systems, the 
hierarchical manner in which they are integrated together, the degree of 
technological novelty of the CoPS in question, and the variety of knowledge 
bases included in the CoPS. Further, user involvement in innovation tends to 
be high, and suppliers, regulators and professional bodies tend to work 
together with users ex-ante to negotiate new product designs, methods of 
production and post-delivery innovations. Markets are often bureaucratically 
administered, and contestability is low in contrast to commodity goods, 
which are characterised by arms-length market transactions. Examples of 
CoPS include a range of buildings and constructions, aircrafts, ships, 
telecommunications networks and a range of military equipment like missile 
systems and battle tanks. 
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 In another paper, Hobday (2000) examines if a project-based 
organisation is the most appropriate delivery mechanism for complex 
products and systems compared to a more functional matrix organisation. 
Based on a case study of a large manufacturer of a wide range of advanced, 
high-cost scientific, industrial, and medical equipment, the paper illustrates 
the wide variety of organisational choices involved in producing CoPS and 
points out that the nature, composition, and scale of the CoPS in question is 
important for the appropriate choice of organisational form.  
 Hobday (2000) identifies some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
two organisational forms for CoPS production. The project-based 
organisation is capable of: 
– Creating and recreating a new organisational structure around each 
CoPS and customer. 
– Coping with emerging properties in production and responding flexibly to 
changing client needs.  
– Integrating different types of knowledge and skills and coping with the 
project risks and uncertainties common in CoPS projects.  
 
The matrix organisation has its strengths where the project as an 
organisational form has its weaknesses: in performing routine tasks, 
achieving economies of scale, coordinating cross-project resources, 
facilitating company-wide technical development, and promoting 
organisation-wide learning. Further, project interests and incentives can 
work against the wider interests of corporate strategy and business 
coordination.  
 In line with the work on CoPS, Gann & Salter (2000) provide an analytical 
framework for understanding the construction industry as embedded in a 
context of both policy-making (regulatory and institutional framework) and 
knowledge production (technical support infrastructure). The model recog-
nises not only the actors, but also the activities taking place. Further, the 
model acknowledges not only the construction industry in a traditional sense 
– namely contractors and consultants – but it also includes the clients of 
construction as well as the manufacturing industry delivering products for 
construction. Based on this resource-based perspective, Gann & Salter 
(2000) frame the links between different actors and activities as knowledge 
flows (see Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Knowledge, information flows and actors in project-based processes. Source: (Gann & Salter, 
2000: 960). 
As pointed out by Gann & Salter (2000), a major challenge for project-based 
firms is to link the project-based processes with the business processes of 
the firm. The project-based nature of construction implies that the interde-
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pendencies are primarily linked to the rather fluently, changing and ad-hoc 
patterns of cooperation with a rather great number of external firms. These 
links are important due to the relatively high degree of autonomy of the indi-
vidual project, while the individual projects to a large extent determine the 
overall performance of a firm.  
 What is less clear is the character of these linkages. Haugbølle & Forman 
(2011) have identified a number of theoretical perspectives on these 
linkages in construction as: 1) knowledge flows (e.g. Gann & Salter, 2000), 
2) functions and regulation (e.g. Carassus (ed.), 2004), 3) governance pro-
cesses (e.g. Winch, 2000 & 2002), 4) a loosely coupled system (e.g. Orton & 
Weick, 1990; Dubois & Gadde, 2002), and 5) strong/weak ties (e.g. Grano-
vetter, 1973; Pryke, 2004 and Chinowsky et al., 2008). Haugbølle & Forman 
(2011) propose an alternative perspective on these linkages as being consti-
tutive rather than being fixed and taken-for-granted, which in turn explores 
and challenges the very ontologies at play (explanans/explanandum) when it 
comes to analytical units (project/firm), relations (couplings) and effects 
(performance/innovation). 
Analytical focus point addressing governance in CoPS in the 
construction sector 
1 How can the linkages be characterised in the systemic model of 
construction as a CoPS proposed by Gann & Salter (2000)? 
Performance in CoPS 
Transaction cost economics provide a framework to compare alternative 
modes of governance: markets, hierarchies and hybrids. According to the 
framework defined by Williamson (1991), uncertainty, frequency of exchange 
and asset specificity render most contracts incomplete. Therefore it is only 
possible to define procedures for resolving unforeseeable outcomes. 
Relational governance is often considered as a complement to contracts. 
Inter-organisational relationships bring trust (Adler, 2001) and facilitate the 
enforcement of obligations. However for large and complex projects informal 
control mechanisms are difficult to maintain. Thus, the aim of this section is 
to explore the detail and dynamics of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms and their changing significance over time. In doing so, we will 
deal specifically with the question of what role performance management 
plays as a specific type of governance mechanism in the process of value 
creation. The aim is thus to examine how performance is governed in CoPS, 
focusing both on performance measurement as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of concern (cf. Georg and Tryggestad, 2009; Harty and Tryggestad, 
2012), i.e. on objectives with measurable targets (Aubert et al., 1996; Barlow 
& Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) and on emergent negotiated objectives. 
The issue of performance in CoPS   
An important feature of applying a perspective of CoPS to the matter of 
value-driven processes in construction is that it directs our attention towards 
issues of distributed agency and the emergent and performative properties 
of production and decision making (Hobday, 1998). What this basically 
entails is that in order to understand how value is created and not least 
judged, we can give up the notion that the success or failure of a project can 
be judged against an “iron triangle” of cost, time and quality as “…incubated 
by rationalist-normative project management theory” (Sage et al., 2013: 
284). Instead, we take an interpretive approach that: “…draw[s] attention to 
the highly political character of seemingly technical measures of 
performance in projects…” (Ibid., 2013: 284).  
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 Two things in particular underpin the need to apply a wider or more 
nuanced perspective on how to understand performance and not least how 
to manage aspects of performance throughout the project process. First, the 
shift towards the delivery of integrated and service-oriented solutions has 
brought about an increasing proliferation of broader, qualitative and more 
dispersed client objectives. Second, and in continuation hereof, the 
increasing turn towards more hybrid forms of organisation and the 
intermingling of public and private interests have prompted the need to 
develop new governance mechanisms that consider the traditional 
contractual control as well as relational coherence (Clegg et al., 2002; 
Gottlieb and Jensen, 2012; Gottlieb and Haugbølle, 2013; Haugbølle et al., 
2013).  
 Thus as Teubner (2006: 51) argued, today we face a “contractual gap” in 
that the contract can no longer be seen as "the consensual exchange 
relation of two legal subjects to which the judge grants legal force”. Rather, a 
contract should be understood as a polycontextual relation that 
simultaneously has to address legal, economic and productive acts in 
accordance with the intrinsic logic of the specific context. Thus, to reduce 
hazards of opportunism and deploy safeguards for every possible future 
contingency, formal control based on detailed and complex contracts is 
insufficient, as the contract can never stipulate every potential contingency. 
Conversely, the relational perspective focuses on the role of trust and 
promotes solidarity and information exchange. 
 As an example, consider a provider of integrated solutions that has to 
provide customers with details about activities to be performed. In a PPP 
project a Performance Measurement System (PMS) with Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI) is established according to the expectations of the public 
authorities. In the event poor performance or buildings unavailability, the 
payments to the private partners can be reduced. To be successful, 
measurement procedures have to go along with the quality of the service.  
Performance criteria 
Several different criteria exist that can be used to define project success and 
measure the level of performance of operation. Hudson et al. (2001: 1102) 
defined six dimensions of performance as follows:  
 
Quality Time Flexibility Finance Customer  
satisfaction 
Human  
resources 
Product 
performance 
Delivery 
reliability 
Waste 
Dependability 
Innovation 
 
Lead time 
Delivery 
reliability 
Process 
throughput 
time 
Process time 
Productivity 
Cycle time 
Delivery 
speed 
Labour efficiency 
Resource 
utilisation 
Manufacturing 
effectiveness 
Resource 
utilisation 
Volume flexibility 
New product 
introduction 
Computer 
systems 
Future growth 
Product 
innovation 
 
Cash flow 
Market share 
Overhead cost 
reduction 
Inventory 
performance 
Cost control 
Sales 
Profitability 
Efficiency 
Product cost 
reduction 
Market share 
Service 
Image 
Integration with 
customers 
Competitiveness 
Innovation 
Delivery 
reliability 
Employee 
relationships 
Employee 
involvement 
Workforce 
Employee skills 
Learning 
Labour efficiency 
Quality of work 
life 
Resource 
utilisation 
Productivity 
Table 2. Critical dimensions of performance (Hudson et al., 2001: 1102) 
Whilst indicative of the breadth of different performance criteria, this does 
not reveal how performance in CoPS is to be conceptualised. Following the 
insights from Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser (2008) and Geyer and Davies (2000), 
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who combined the concept of large technical systems (LTS) and CoPS, we 
would argue that performance, in contrast to the traditional perceptions 
within the area of construction management, is no longer solely an issue 
confined to “the project” but that also the “operational system” has to be 
considered (Geyer and Davies, 2000: 992). Adding to this complexity, the 
project should be seen as consisting of a web or network of suppliers 
including “…systems integrators, prime contractors, subcontractors, 
specialist suppliers and government regulatory bodies, responsible for 
executing projects to meet […] the public requirements.” On the other hand, 
we have the operational system, which is composed of (facility) operators, 
owners and regulators that are responsible for operating and delivering 
services through a system to end users. Viewing the provision of building 
works and services in this combined LTS / CoPS perspective emphasises 
the heterogeneous and dispersed nature of technological change and the 
management hereof. This also extends to the issue of system performance, 
where Geyer and Davies (2000) argued that the efficiency of a system 
(CoPS) is dependent on a large number of different components that all 
contribute to the overall goal of the system. What this entails is therefore that 
performance has to be “measured” and evaluated according to a diversity of 
stakeholder perspectives and different technical, normative, regulative and 
cognitive-cultural concerns.  
 Somewhat along these lines of reasoning, Van de Riet (2003) has 
proposed the following typology of actor perspectives on (infrastructure) 
performance that considers technological, economic, public-policy and 
business-development factors. Focussing on the two dimensions of 
performance domains and actor perspectives, the following overview of 
divergent goals related to infrastructure performance is given:  
 
 
Figure 7. Overview of the divergent goals related to infrastructure performance (Van de Riet, 2003: 41).  
The performance domains (left hand column in Figure 6) are related to 
infrastructure and are based on insights from various infrastructure sectors. 
In an LTS / CoPS perspective on construction works and services, we would 
however argue that these are also representative of the projects studied in 
this project. The second dimension, (top row in Figure ) highlights very 
broadly different actor perspectives on infrastructure. In reality, Van de Riet 
(2003) argued, there are a myriad of possible perspectives on infrastructure, 
however these can usually be seen as combinations of three basic actor 
Price, Costs and Revenue 
Affordable prices 
Fixed and variable cost 
are covered 
Beneficiaries pay all costs 
Minimum price 
Stable prices 
Maximum revennue 
Predictable prices 
Service Quality 
 
(including assets, attractiveness  
and reliability)  
Universal access 
Welfare of society 
Service always meets 
demand 
Unrestricted access  to 
supplier  
Welfare of user 
Service on demand 
Unrestricted access to 
user 
Minimum downtime of 
service 
Environmental Effects 
Minimization of the 
amount of resources 
affected and depleted 
-- -- 
Safety, Health and Privacy 
Safety and  health of 
everyone 
Security of everyone’s 
private information 
Safety and health of the 
user 
Security of the user’s 
private information 
Safety and health of the 
supplier 
Security of the supplier’s 
private information 
Society User Supplier 
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views, being society, user and supplier. For the purposes of this study, 
keeping in line with the CoPS perspective, we however operate with the 
following four actor perspectives: (i) society, (ii) operational system, (iii) 
project; and (iv) user.  
 For each performance domain, each actor has different goals to achieve 
and the idea behind the above typology is that it can guide an understanding 
“…about the background of conflicts of interests in debates about the 
performance of existing infrastructure and the design of necessary changes.” 
(Van de Riet, 2003: 39). In other words, being sensitive to the heterogeneity 
of different legitimate goals and aspirations of different actors involved in 
complex projects and CoPS enables us to understand what motivates 
particular discussions and to understand the various types of governance 
mechanisms that are put in place to deal with the controversies at stake in 
different project systems.  
Analytical focus point addressing performance in CoPS  
Following the above model, we argue that controversies, or contradictions 
(cf. Gottlieb and Haugbølle, 2013), can arise both as a result of tensions 
between different actor perceptions within a single performance domain and 
as a result of contradictions between goals in different performance 
domains. The crucial research question in relation to performance in CoPS 
thus is: 
1 How can contradictions and controversies between different actors’ 
perspectives on performance goals be balanced by means of innovative 
contractual mechanisms that each represents a specific strategy for the 
handling of this complexity?  
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Cases  
This chapter begins with an introduction to the differences between the 
Danish and the French system as the basis for comparative studies between 
Denmark and France. This is followed by three Danish cases and three 
French cases. 
Comparative studies - Construction business in France and 
Denmark 
Background 
Table 3 summarises some key figures on France and Denmark. The 
population of France is about 12 times the population of Denmark, while the 
area of France is about 15 times the size of Denmark. Thus, the population 
density is somewhat higher in Denmark compared to France, and the two 
countries are positioned above and below the European average, 
respectively. The degree of urbanisation is roughly the same. 
 In economic terms, both countries are positioned above the European 
average. While the gross domestic product (GDP) of France is comfortably 
higher than the European average, the gross domestic product of Denmark 
is significantly higher than both France and Europe in general.  
 The same difference can be observed with regard to investment in 
research and development (R&D), where Danish investment is almost 50% 
higher than the average. 
 With regard to construction activities, the contribution from construction to 
the GDP is markedly lower in Denmark than France and Europe in general. 
A similar marked difference with regard to construction employment cannot 
be observed. It should be noted, though, that the definition of construction 
activities does not include consultancies. Despite its small size and 
population, Denmark has a number of engineering consultancies within the 
top 150 global design firms (Engineering News-Record, 2013). It may be 
speculated that a larger share of the Danish GDP stems from knowledge-
intensive businesses like engineering consultancies due to the more 
prominent role of consultants in the Danish building process compared to 
France.  
 
 Denmark France EU-27 
Population (in millions) 5.6 65.3 503.3 
Area (km2) 42,895 632,834 4,324,782 
Population density (people/km2) 129.7 103.0 116.9 
Degree of urbanisation1 75.3 81.8 73.8 
Gross Domestic Product (million EUR) 245,037 2,032,296 12,923,838 
Gross Domestic Product/capita (‘000 EUR) 43,800 31,100 25,600 
Gross expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.09 2.24 2.03 
Construction contribution to GDP (% of GDP) 4.7 6.3 5.9 
Construction employees (% of total based on hours worked) 6.9 7.9 7.4 
Table 3. Key figures on Denmark and France compared to EU-27 countries. Note 1: Degree of 
urbanisation measured as percentage of population living in densely populated areas plus intermediate 
urbanised area. Note 2: Year 2012 if available, otherwise 2010 and 2011. Source: (Danmarks Statistik, 
2013; Insee, 2013; Eurostat. 2013). 
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Similarities and differences 
There are a number of notable similarities and differences between the 
Danish and the French construction business systems. This section is by 
and large an extract based on a conference paper by (Haugbølle et al., 
2013). 
 As in most mature markets in the developed world, the construction 
market for refurbishment in both Denmark and France is by and large of the 
same size as the market for new buildings. 
 The business structure, and thus the position of the main actors of the 
building process, differs between Denmark and France. The Danish building 
process shares many of the same characteristics as the professional system 
in the UK, which is dominated by consultants. This is quite different from the 
French industrial system in which contractors are more dominant (Levring & 
Bonke, 1996; Winch & Campagnac, 1995; Winch, 2000 & 2002; Carassus, 
2005). 
 Contrary to France, a Bureau de Contrôle does not exist in Denmark and 
insurance companies play a more modest role in the Danish building 
process compared with the French building process, where construction 
insurance plays a significant role (Söderberg et al., 2004). However, two 
building defects funds were established in Denmark in the 1980s within 
social housing and refurbishment of aging multi-family dwellings in order to 
inspect buildings for defects and provide insurance cover. In recent years, a 
new mandatory insurance scheme for private housing developments has 
been implemented. Insurance is offered by some private insurers, but not all. 
 The typical procurement protocols in both countries are traditional (or 
trade) contracting, main (or general) contracting, and design-build 
contracting. Contracts in Denmark are typically based on the ABR89 
General Conditions for Consulting Services (1989), AB92 General 
Conditions for Works and Supplies for Building and Civil Engineering Works 
(1992) or ABT93 General Conditions for Design-Build Contracting (1993). It 
is mandatory for publicly supported clients to follow these agreed 
documents, whereas private clients are free to choose whatever 
procurement protocol they deem fit. In practice, the agreed documents, with 
some modifications, form the bulk of construction contracts in Denmark 
(Levring & Bonke, 1996). Similar agreed documents exist in France. 
 Integrated delivery mechanisms, including private financing of public 
projects, have developed along quite different paths. In recent years, much 
attention is being paid to integrated delivery mechanisms in Denmark. This 
has led to a hybrid practice of design-build contracting – by some 
practitioners termed “controlled design-build contracting” – in which the client 
exercises a greater influence on the design than is usual for the ordinary 
design-build contract. The client makes the initial contact to a design team 
for a conceptual design, which is then followed by a slightly adapted design-
build contract in which the client retains some degree of control of the design 
(Söderberg et al. 2004; Levring & Bonke, 1996). 
 In Denmark, the development of new delivery mechanisms has been 
supported by a number of subsequent development programmes: Project 
New Ways of Collaboration, Clients Create Value (in Danish, Bygherren 
skaber Værdi), and the PLUS network (Partnering, Learning, Development, 
Collaboration). The diffusion of integrated delivery mechanisms has been 
championed by the public authorities and certain key actors in the building 
process like the contractor, NCC. Today, partnering has become a fairly 
widely used delivery mechanism, while it is still in its infancy for energy-
service companies (ESCO). Mechanisms like public-private partnerships and 
integrated procurement are seldom used (see e.g. Larsen et al. (eds.), 
2010). 
 France has long experience in private finance procurement, primarily 
within infrastructure projects; more specifically road construction. Public 
authorities grant specific rights to a private partner to construct, maintain and 
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operate the infrastructure for a given period. The private partner operates 
the service at his own risk and is remunerated in the form of a fee paid by 
the users of the service. Owing to this experience, French companies 
working in this market have developed strong capabilities to design and 
construct roads as well as to operate, maintain and finance the infrastructure 
during its life cycle. 
 Only a limited number of buildings have been delivered under this form of 
procurement. Indeed, according to the French Act no 85.704 of 12 July 
1985, the public client generally drafts two different contracts with the 
architect and the contractor, respectively. Design, build and operate (DBO) 
is possible, but the client has to demonstrate that this is less expensive or 
technically necessary. However, finance cannot be transferred to the private 
partner. 
 In June 2004, a new law was passed, which proposed a complementary 
framework. It introduced the partnership contract (“Contrat de partenariat”). 
Under this new scheme, design, build, finance and operation could be 
transferred to private partners. The partnership contract has become the 
most commonly used public-private partnership (PPP) contract. At the end of 
June 2012, 122 contracts had been signed. This change in the regulatory 
framework has encouraged the major French contractors to develop new 
operational service capabilities in order to maintain, operate and upgrade 
buildings throughout their life cycle. Their strategy has been two-fold. First, 
the contractors used the PFI market in the UK to develop facilities and 
management capabilities, as well as to acquire knowledge of the different 
stages of a building’s life cycle. Second, on the basis of this experience, the 
general contractors have been awarded most of the French partnership 
contracts. 
Case 1: ESCO: Frederiksberg municipality 
Driven by the 2006 EU Directive on Energy Services and the 2007 Danish 
strategy for energy improvements of the building stock, recent years have 
seen a proliferation of initiatives and activities aimed at reducing energy 
consumption in the built environment. One of the initiatives that have gained 
the most attention and the most widespread use is ESCO.  
 ESCO is an abbreviation of Energy Service Company. According to Vine 
(2005: 691) an energy service company is a company that “…is engaged in 
developing, installing and financing comprehensive, performance-based 
projects, typically 5-10 years in duration, centred around improving the 
energy efficiency or load reduction of facilities owned or operated by 
customers.”  
 Bertoldi et al. (2006) have provided a definition of ESCOs that draws a 
distinction between different types of energy service company. Thus, they 
used the term Energy Service Provider Companies (ESPCs) to refer to 
companies that “…provide energy services to final energy users, including 
the supply and installation of energy-efficient equipment, and/or building 
refurbishment, maintenance and operation, facility management, and the 
supply of energy (including heat)” (Bertoldi et al., 2006: 1820).  
 Although an ESCO also offer the same services, there are some 
differences of a rather crucial nature. While an ESPC provides a service for 
a fee and takes no risk, an ESCO:  
– guarantees the energy savings (as reflected in the contract),  
– can provide finance, or via energy savings guarantee assistance in 
arranging finance, for the operation of an energy system, and  
– has its remuneration directly tied to the energy savings achieved (Bertoldi 
et al., 2006: 1821). 
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As such, an ESCO accepts a degree of risk for the achievement of improved 
energy efficiency in a user’s facility. This is echoed in the EU directive on 
energy end-use efficiency and energy services (The European Parliament, 
2006) in which an ESCO is defined as: “…a natural or legal person that 
delivers energy services and/or other energy efficiency improvements 
measures in a user’s facility or premises, and accepts some degree of 
financial risk in so doing. The payment for the services delivered is based 
(either wholly or in part) on the achievement of energy efficiency 
improvements and on the meeting of the other agreed performance criteria.”  
 Jensen et al. (2013), in their study of ESCOs in Denmark, document that 
especially municipalities have championed the uptake and use of this 
particular way to improve the standard of public buildings and to increase 
energy efficiency. Thus, they document that in the beginning of 2013, 30 
municipalities (of the 98 municipalities in Denmark, are involved in, or 
preparing, ESCO contracts (Jensen et al., 2013: 2407). Recently, 
Frederiksberg municipality (see Frederiksberg Kommune, 2012a; 2012b; 
2012c; 2012d; 2012e; 2012f) has also chosen to realise energy reductions 
by means of an ESCO approach, and this is the focus of the present case.  
The context  
Frederiksberg municipality’s interest in energy refurbishment and ESCOs is 
motivated by a commitment to realise CO2 reductions and energy savings as 
a part of the Danish national target to be independent of fossil fuels by 2050. 
A large part of the municipal CO2 emissions are related to the municipal 
building stock and energy consumption is a decisive factor in these CO2 
emissions. Therefore, in 2011, the municipality decided to put up for tender 
the task of realising “…a part of this potential according to a model in which 
the municipality enters into an agreement with an energy service company 
(an ESCO)” (Frederiksberg Kommune, 2012a; own translation).  
 In the beginning of 2013, Frederiksberg Municipality (in guise of FK 
Properties, being the municipal property operator) entered into an 
agreement with Schneider Electric on the energy refurbishment of 
approximately 80-100 municipal buildings. The actual refurbishment 
activities are planned to be completed by 2017, after which the municipality 
and Schneider Electric will commence a partnership on the operation of the 
completed project and documentation of the guaranteed savings.  
The procurement characteristics 
The works were tendered as a design-build contract and encompass approx. 
80-100 properties owned by the municipality, including daycare institutions, 
schools, cultural institutions and administrative and sports facilities. In total 
211,000 m2 of buildings were put up for tender. Eight of these properties 
were designated as “Track 1 properties” entailing that the municipality is 
contractually obliged to initiate the energy-reducing measures upon contract 
signing, i.e. in 2013. The remaining properties, the so-called “Track 2 
properties”, will be energy refurbished subject to a subsequent energy 
analysis.  
 Track 2 properties will be bundled in so-called “year categories” that will 
be in accordance with the annual financial allocations established by the 
municipal council for the years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
 In addition to the track 1 and track 2 properties, a so-called “flagship 
project” has been designated. The purpose of this project is to present the 
ESCO project to the public. This project is to have a good signal value and 
include visible CO2 reduction measures, e.g. photovoltaic cells, solar thermal 
collectors, geothermal heating system, etc.  
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Figure 8.”Photo voltaic building on the flagship project“ by Schneider Electric is licensed under CC BY 
2.0 
The actual work being tendered concerns measures to optimise lighting, 
heating and ventilation. Potentially, improvements of both installations (the 
technical systems) and the building envelope (primarily insulation, doors and 
windows) are covered by the contract, depending on the feasibility of the 
improvements. The contract also covers measures related to the installation 
of renewable energy technologies. 
 The project covers three phases in addition to phase 0 (tender), as 
illustrated below:   
 
 
Figure 9. Phases in the project (from the tender documents) 
The phases are: (i) energy analysis, i.e. mapping of the potential for energy 
reduction, (ii) contractor phase, i.e. design and execution of energy-reducing 
measures; and (iii) follow-up, i.e. operation including verification of obtained 
effects and educational activities for municipal personnel prior to handover.  
 In the selection stage in phase 0, potential contractors/operators were 
assessed on their economic and financial ability and on their technical 
capacity, and four operators were invited to bid for the contract. The actual 
contract was awarded based on the most economically advantageous tender 
approach using the following weighted sub-criteria:   
1 Economic model (60%) 
2 Suggested technical solutions (20%) 
3 Flagship project (10%)  
4 Investigation and completion competencies (10%) 
 
This model was chosen due to the complexity of the project and the client’s 
need to balance financial and technical concerns, including the municipality’s 
obligation as a “climate municipality” to reduce CO2 emissions and at the 
same time keep within the annual financial allocations.  
The complexity of the project 
The project can be considered complex due to the highly varied portfolio of 
properties included in the tender. Specifically, the track one properties 
selected:  
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– vary in size 
– have a functional width, i.e. represent different types of use 
– represent different building traditions due to year of completion; and 
– test the width and depth of the ESCO’s ”project catalogue” / 
competencies 
 
Further adding to the complexity of the project are two things in particular. 
First, the use of the properties might change during the contract period with 
regards to e.g. the number of users in the individual buildings, the number of 
rooms being utilized, the periods of use of the different rooms, as well as the 
actual use of the rooms including equipment etc. Second, the municipality 
reserved the right to refurbish or change building components that are not 
covered by the contracted energy services, if such works will result in energy 
reductions. As both of the above concerns impact the energy baseline of the 
properties, this leads to issues in relation to the actual enforcement of the 
monitoring process.  
 Following Hobday’s (1998: 690) description of Complex Systems and 
Products (CoPS) complexity can be understood as: “…the number of 
customised components, the breadth of knowledge and skills required and 
the degree of new knowledge involved in production, as well as other critical 
product dimensions.” Using these critical product dimensions as a starting 
point, we can draw up a characterization of the complexity of the ESCO case 
accordingly: 
 
 
Figure 10. Complexity of the ESCO case. (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
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Unit cost / financial scale of project: Score – medium  
The unit cost/financial scale of an ESCO project can vary much from case to 
case. Christensen and Sundman (2007) have reported from Danish cases 
that total investments in energy services varied from as little as € 67.000 
upwards. The Frederiksberg case is the largest ECSO project in Denmark, 
however compared to “conventional” projects the financial scale can be 
considered medium.   
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – very high  
The product volume in the ESCO project is small in the sense that each 
project is customized and solutions have to be integrated within existing 
product systems.    
Degree of technological novelty: Score – low 
Technological novelty is just below average. Although new technological 
solutions may be produced ESCO is more a matter of organisational / 
contractual novelty than technological innovation.    
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – medium 
The extent of embedded software in product is medium. Specific solutions 
might have a high extent of embedded software; however, could also be 
rather mundane e.g. refurbishment of windows and facades. On the 
Frederiksberg case software is used for monitoring energy consumption. 
The software is at the core of the guaranteed savings scheme.   
Quantity of sub-systems and components: Score – medium 
The quantity of sub-systems and components could be high depending on 
the specific ESCO in case. In this case a substantial number of sub-systems 
and components have been utilised.  
Degree of customisation of components: Score – medium 
Although, each ESCO solution has to be adapted to fit client needs standard 
components have been used.   
Degree of customisation of final system: Score – very high 
Each ESCO solution is bespoke due to its specific integration with existing 
systems.  
Complexity and choice of system architectures: Score – medium 
Integration between different sub-systems induces complexity. A given 
solution not only has to be adapted in a given product, but could also be part 
of a larger supply network e.g. on local or regional scale.  
Quantity of alternative component design paths: Score – medium 
Component design path depends on the given ESCO wherefore quantity of 
alternatives are somewhat high.  
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score – high 
Continuous monitoring of actual energy consumption is used extensive to 
correct solutions and ensure that energy savings targets are met. Feedback 
from track 1 properties is furthermore used in the design of technical 
solutions for track 2 properties and the possible renegotiation of the 
contractual terms.  
Variety of distinct knowledge bases: Score – medium 
As in any construction project, ESCO solutions include a wide variety of 
distinct actors and knowledge bases as is also discussed further in 
“organisational setup” section of the case.   
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Variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – high 
High due to the number of direct and indirect stakeholders that are part of 
the project on strategic as well as operational levels. The success of an 
ESCO critically depends on the ability of all stakeholders to contribute 
towards meeting requirements for energy savings.  
Intensity of user involvement: Score – very high 
Very high, as energy services typically are implemented in existing products, 
companies and buildings and have to be developed in close dialogue 
between the client and the ESCO – and also additional stakeholders.    
Uncertainty / change in user requirements: Score – very high 
See above. 
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score – low 
The ESCO thus operates as both a technical consultant and as a design-
and-build contractor during the project and is thus responsible for all 
supplies. Due to the scope of the project and the number of possible 
technical solution other suppliers will be involved, however not in a scale 
exceeding conventional projects.  
Intensity of regulatory involvement: Score – very high 
As Vine (2005: 694) have argued: “The legal and regulatory frameworks are 
not compatible with energy-efficiency investments, particularly energy 
performance contracting. In particular, measurement and verification 
protocols for assuring performance guarantees are not understood.” 
Furthermore, Vine (2005) has also noted that the EU is heavily engaged in 
establishing a market for ESCO in Europe. Furthermore, in Denmark, ESCO 
is mentioned in the government’s energy strategy (Regeringen, 2009) as a 
business model that can help reach the national energy reduction targets.   
Type of contract 
The project comprises four different agreements: (i) a partnership 
agreement, (ii) a consultancy and analysis agreement (iii) a contracting and 
implementation agreement; and (iv) a service agreement. The partnership 
agreement can be mutually terminated by each of the parties, after which the 
agreement relationship will have the form of an ordinary agreement without 
the same degree of reciprocity and development of ideas and methods as 
presupposed in the partnership.  
 The phase one agreement between the municipality and the ESCO is 
based on the Danish “ABR 89 – General Conditions for Consulting 
Services”, whereas the agreement in phase two is based on the Danish 
“ABT 93 – General Conditions for Turnkey Contracts.” The ESCO thus 
operates as both a technical consultant and as a design-and-build contractor 
during the project. The third phase of the project is governed by a monitoring 
and operating contract that is entered by the parties in order to ensure the 
delivery of the guaranteed savings that are the object of exchange in the 
contract. Such a guaranteed savings approach is the most commonly used 
approach to ESCOs in European countries. In contrast to a “shared savings 
approach”, this entails that it is municipality that finances the refurbishment 
and thus does not bear any performance risk – a risk that instead is 
assumed solely by the ESCO.  
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Figure 11. Primary savings structures (Dreessen, 2003 in Bertoldi et al:, 2006: 1822). 
In the Frederiksberg case, Schneider Electric, as the ESCO, makes 
suggestions for specific improvements to the properties and guarantees the 
municipality’s savings. Should the savings not be met, Schneider Electric will 
cover the difference. If savings in excess of the guaranteed savings are 
realised, the surplus will be split three ways, with one-third going to 
Schneider Electric, one-third to Frederiksberg municipality and one-third to 
the properties covered by the contract.  
 The contract between Schneider Electric and Frederiksberg municipality 
was entered in 2013, and a total of DKK 30 million was allocated to (i) 
energy refurbishment of track 1 properties, (ii) cover the expenses related to 
the services of the track 1 properties in phase 3 (follow-up and monitoring) 
and (iii) conduct the energy analyses of all track 2 properties. Furthermore, 
the following investment framework was set up in accordance with the 
annual financial allocations of the municipality: 
– In 2014 a maximum of DKK 23 million have been allocated  
– In 2015 a maximum of DKK 34 million have been allocated 
– In 2016 a maximum of DKK 31 million have been allocated 
– In 2017 a maximum of DKK 30 million have been allocated 
 
For the guaranteed energy reduction, the maximum pay-back time of the 
investment must not exceed 14 years.  
Organisational structure 
The project’s formal and general organisational structure comprises a 
”management group” and a “contract group”. The management group 
assumes overall responsibility for ensuring that the objectives in the 
partnership agreement are complied with. The management group consists 
of participants from the senior management at the municipality, the ESCO 
and the ESCO’s potential technical consultants. A central task of the 
management group is to function as a conflict resolution board in the 
eventuality of disputes related to the services. The contract group is the 
operational authority of the formal organisation. The contract group has 
authority to make corrections and decisions pertaining to allocation of 
personnel, time schedules, execution methods and minor financial changes.  
 In line with the specific partnership agreement and the general 
implementation of partnering in Denmark (cf. Gottlieb & Haugbølle, 2013), 
the project operates under a governance scheme in which leading 
employees from the ESCO, the ESCO’s technical consultants and the 
ESCO’s subcontractors can only be substituted at the discretion of the client. 
Moreover, the client can demand substitution of employees in order to 
ensure project success. Following Geyer and Davies’ (2000) conceptual 
model of project-system interfaces, the project organisation structure can be 
illustrated accordingly:  
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Figure 12. Project-system interfaces in the ESCO project.  
Monitoring process 
The monitoring process is central to the ESCO agreement. As the projects 
are completed under a guaranteed savings contract and in accordance with 
a strict municipal investment framework, client and well as contractor have a 
mutual interest in establishing a solid foundation for the monitoring process. 
A central aspect of the monitoring process is the preliminary establishment 
of the “energy baseline” that constitutes the basis on which the bidders have 
to calculate their guaranteed savings. The baseline is established as the 
energy consumption of each property, corrected for the number of degree 
days (weather normalized). The same calculation principles have to be 
applied for each of the properties, and the guarantees for the annual 
categories have to be based on the same principles as applied in the basis 
for calculation of savings in the track 1 properties.  
 As a part of the service agreement, the ESCO has to conduct training 
programmes for the municipality’s employees to ensure that these are 
capable of servicing the energy solutions. Once a year, the ESCO is 
contractually obliged to give an account of the exact energy consumption of 
each individual energy source as a part of the calculation of the guaranteed 
energy savings. Moreover, accounts have to be submitted to the municipality 
four times a year to be addressed in the current project management, 
budgetary projections and control of effects.  
Results 
Due to the time frame of the project, it is not possible to conclude on the 
results of the ESCO project in terms of actual energy savings. It is, however, 
possible to point at some preliminary and more general qualitative results. 
First, it should be noted that the ESCO in itself has been a catalyst for the 
refurbishment of the municipal building stock. Due to strict financial control 
and reduced annual financial allocations, the ESCO approach constituted a 
solution to both the municipal energy reduction targets as well the general 
maintenance backlog of the properties to accommodate for increased use 
due to population growth in the municipality.   
 Second, on the economic results, projections from Frederiksberg 
Municipality estimate that by the end of 2013 the ESCO-Frederiksberg 
partnership will have implemented energy saving measures that will reduce 
the municipal energy purchases for the track 1 properties by app. 1,100,000 
kWh/year electricity and 1,800 MWh/year heating; corresponding to app. 
DKK 2.5 million. The continued energy refurbishment of the municipal 
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properties until 2017 will result in a total reduction in electricity and heating 
expenses of around DKK 11 million per year.   
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
This case represents a type of delivery system for mobilising private 
financing of public services. It is an example of a dual financial and 
organisational innovation (see also the UN City case) under the auspices of 
the ESCO that functions as a systems integrator coupling the project and the 
operational system. As such no product innovations have been developed.   
Governance mechanisms 
In terms of governance processes, this coupling of the project and the 
operational system takes place through a mixture of distinct policy, business 
and learning processes as proposed in the model developed by Haugbølle 
et al. (2012) presented previously in this report. The policy processes that 
predominantly takes place between the regulatory framework on one hand 
and the various businesses on the other hand, can be characterised as a 
politicisation of industry business processes by the setting of targets – or 
management by objectives. On the topic of business processes, the case 
provides an example of a hybrid organisational arrangement in which both 
traditional transactional as well as relational governance mechanisms are 
applied. These cover the standard description of services and conditions for 
the provision of works and supplies within building and engineering (ABR89 
and ABT93) and a partnership agreement that runs for the entire duration of 
the operation of the technical installations. This combination has proved 
pivotal in the concurrent negotiations between the municipality and the 
supplier regarding changes to the contract. Thus a recent legislative change 
in relation to the so-called ‘solar cell law’ reduced the payment for the 
overproduction of electricity with 70 percent leading to a reduced profitability 
of the technical installations and prolonged payback period. The change in 
payback time has not had any contractual consequences as this according 
to the municipality only constitutes a minor change to the existing contract 
between the municipality and the ESCO that can be settled without a new 
tender. Finally, the learning processes are centred on the guaranteed 
savings scheme which with its baseline measurements and monitoring of 
energy consumption in the properties that proven to constitute an effective 
feedback mechanism directly links the project with the operational system 
and provides, if not real-time feedback, then at least a highly responsive 
mechanism for the concurrent and subsequent upgrade of the municipal 
facilities.  
The performance process and the value to the end users 
With regard to performance measurement, Frederiksberg municipality and 
Schneider Electric have been successful in in meeting a series of 
performance demands at societal level as well as in relation to both user and 
supplier side. At societal level, the ESCO setup help meet national emission 
reduction targets and at the same time, both Frederiksberg municipality and 
the ESCO profit financially from the partnership without placing any 
limitations on the use of the properties.   
Case 2: Client partnership: UN City 
This chapter is in part based on two previous conference papers by 
Haugbølle et al. (2012 and 2013). 
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The context 
The capital area of Copenhagen is growing rapidly. The number of 
inhabitants is expected to increase by 100,000 people or 18% by 2025. At 
the same time the business structure is changing rapidly. Heavy industry is 
disappearing from the Port of Copenhagen, which is freeing up new areas 
for urban development (see Figure 13). One of the most prominent areas is 
Nordhavnen, the Northern Harbour of Copenhagen (By & Havn, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 13. Today Nordhavnen is an industrial area. Photo: Kim Haugbølle. 
In December 2005, the Danish government and the City of Copenhagen 
reached an agreement on the principles that would govern urban 
development of the Port of Copenhagen, including Nordhavnen. This 
agreement became an Act of Parliament that was adopted on 22 May 2007. 
In May 2008, an open international ideas competition on the sustainable city 
of the future was launched, attracting some 180 proposals. In March 2009, 
the result of the competition was announced. The winning proposal, titled 
“Nordholmene – Urban Delta”, was developed by a team composed of 
COBE, SLETH MODERNISM, Polyform and Rambøll. During the summer of 
2009, the winning proposal was reviewed, and its development strategies 
were further detailed and specified. The six themes of the winning proposal 
are 1) islets and canals, 2) identity and history, 3) five-minute city, 4) blue 
and green city, 5) CO2 friendly city, and 6) intelligent grid. During 2010-11, 
the City of Copenhagen developed a supplement to the Municipal Plan as 
well as a local plan for Nordhavnen (By & Havn, 2009). 
 Nordhavnen is expected to be developed over the next 40 years to house 
40,000 inhabitants and 40,000 employees. The development of Nordhavnen 
is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the inner Nordhavn (the 
so-called Århusgade Quarter), comprising about 350,000 m2 of new gross 
floor area and preservation of some of the existing buildings with a gross 
floor area of 70,000 m2. In the second stage, scheduled to start in 2018, an 
additional 200,000 m2 may be developed. In a third stage – which has not 
yet been detailed – the entire Nordhavnen may eventually be developed to 
include buildings with a gross floor area of 3-4 million m2 (By & Havn, 2009). 
 The UN City is the first of a number of new developments to be 
constructed in the inner part of Nordhavnen. The intentions behind the 
development of the UN City are to gather all of the representations of the 
United Nations in Denmark in one location in order to stimulate inter-agency 
operations and collaborations etc. Today, the United Nations have eight 
agencies in Denmark, located in different locations, with some 1,100-1,200 
employees. The eight agencies include the Nordic Office of UNDP (UN 
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Development Programme), the European headquarters of WHO (World 
Health Organization), the headquarters of the Supply Division of UNICEF 
(UN Children’s Fund), one of the Liaison Offices of WFP (World Food 
Programme), one of the Liaison Offices of UNFPA (UN Population Fund), 
the headquarters of UNOPS (UN Office for Project Service), the Nordic 
Office of UN Women and the two collaborating centres of UNEP (United 
Nations Environment Program)  UNEP Risø Centre (URC) and UNEP-DHI 
Centre (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 The UN City actually consists of two campuses in the Northern Harbour of 
Copenhagen (Nordhavnen). Campus 1 encompasses the domicile of the UN 
and is situated on the Marble Pier (Marmormolen) as part of the Århusgade 
Quarter (see Figure 14). Campus 2 includes a fully automated high bay 
warehouse for UNICEF with a capacity of close to 40,000 cubic meters, 
which was built in the Free Port at the outer part of the Northern Harbour of 
Copenhagen and operational from the beginning of 2012. The warehouse 
handles goods for development and emergency projects around the world 
(Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 
 
Figure 14: The star-shaped UN City. Architects: 3XN A/S. 
The new domicile of the UN at Campus 1 will be constructed in two phases. 
The first phase covers the construction of some 28,000 m2 gross floor area 
and some 5,000 m2 of basement in a single storey for technical installations 
and storage. This phase was finished in the beginning of 2013. The building 
is constructed as a star-shaped building with eight “fingers”, of which phase 
1 consists of the central and Eastern part of the star, making up the first five 
“fingers”. In the beginning of 2014, the second phase completed the star by 
adding the last three “fingers”, after the existing UNICEF warehouse had 
been demolished. This increased the gross floor area by 17,000 m2 to a total 
of 45,000 m2 and added some 3,000 m2 extra to the basement (Pihl & Søn 
A/S, 2012; Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013).  
 The building has been constructed as a low-energy class 1 building 
according to the Danish Building Regulations, which means the energy 
consumption is projected to be lower than 50 kWh/m2/year. In addition, the 
building is certified according to the American certification scheme LEED 
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) with the goal of achieving 
a minimum score of LEED Gold and reaching at least 73 LEED points 
according to Version 3 of the LEED scheme. In fact, the building reached 
platinum. Furthermore, the developer, FN-BYEN P/S, was one of the first 
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Danish organisations to become a Green Building Partner. The main 
requirement of the European Union’s Green Building scheme is to reduce 
energy consumption by 25% compared to national regulation (European 
Commission – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy and Transport, 
2006). The building uses recycled rainwater for toilet flush, cooling is with 
sea water, all lighting is automatically controlled, photo-voltaic cells is 
installed on the roof of the building and a specially designed solar-shading 
system provides protection against the sun (see Figure 15). Due to strict 
security measures, the building is erected on an isolated island. The island is 
linked to the mainland through one bridge, which is only accessible by foot 
or by small vehicles (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 
 
Figure 15. UN City. Photo: Kim Haugbølle. 
The procurement characteristics 
The development of Nordhavnen is being carried out by the developer CPH 
City Port and Development I/S. CPH City Port and Development was 
established in October 2007 and is owned 55% by the City of Copenhagen 
and 45% by the Danish government, which exercises its ownership through 
the Ministry of Transport. CPH City Port and Development I/S is responsible 
for development of the properties owned in Ørestad and the Port of 
Copenhagen, along with the operation of port activities through its 
subsidiary; Copenhagen Malmö Port (CMP). The company is required to 
carry out its activities on ordinary commercial grounds, predominantly 
through the sale of building rights (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 The local plan for Marmormolen includes 23,000 m2 of office buildings, 
28,000 m2 housing, a hotel of 25,000 m2, the 45,000 m2 for the UN City and 
58,000 m2 for the so-called LM Project. The LM Project includes two office 
towers at Marmormolen and the tip of Langelinie, and is connected with a 
bicycle and footbridge at a height of 65 m. The local plan for Marmormolen 
was approved by the City of Copenhagen on 10 December 2009 
(Københavns Kommune, 2010). 
 The development of Marmormolen (the Marble Pier) was initially handled 
by the Byggemodningsselskabet Marmormolen P/S consortium, owned by 
CPH City Port and Development (50% ownership) and the private investor N 
& S P/S (50%), which in turn is owned by Nordkranen A/S and SNS Property 
Finance. During 2011 CPH City Port and Development increased its 
ownership to 90%, while the ownership of N & S P/S was reduced to 10% 
(Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013).  
 The UN City was developed by FN-Byen P/S with its associated limited 
partnership company. The company was owned by CPH City Port and 
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Development (99.2% ownership) and Nordkranen A/S (0.8% ownership). 
The purpose of the company was to prepare the area for construction, and 
then to construct and let properties at Marmormolen. In December 2011, a 
new consortium called Harbour P/S, owned by CPH City Port and 
Development (8.5% ownership) and the two pension funds ATP (45.75% 
ownership) and PensionDanmark (45.75% ownership) bought the UN City 
along with the building rights for the nearby LM Project for DKK 2.1 billion. 
CPH City Port and Development sold most of its ownership of the UN City 
and the LM Project and now holds only a minor share of ownership 
(Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 While ownership of the UN City is with the consortium, CPH City Port and 
Development is acting as the building client as well as the letting office of the 
property. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the lease-holder on a long-term 
lease contract of annually DKK 77.5 million for 15 years for the UN City and 
on a long-term lease contract of annually DKK 42.9 million for 25 years for 
the warehouse (Udenrigsministeriet, 2010). The UN representations are the 
actual users of the UN City. On behalf of the UN representations, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs hired Alectia and PLH Arkitekter as consults for 
the user organisations. As is customary for UN representations, the nation 
hosting the UN representation makes properties available to the UN 
representations and pays the lease. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does 
not in itself have the necessary skills and organisation to manage building 
projects, the Ministry is obliged by law to have the Danish Palace and 
Property Agency under the Ministry of Finance as construction and facility 
manager (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 The new headquarters at UN City has been designed by one of the 
leading Danish architectural firms: 3XN A/S. The architects also drafted the 
master plan for the Marble Pier together with architects Kim Utzon (for the 
hotel), SCHØNHERR LANDSKAB (the landscape) and Steven Holl 
Architects (the LM Project), which formed the backdrop for the local plan. 
The consulting engineers were Leif Hansen Rådgivende Ingeniører A/S, who 
merged with Orbicon during the project (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 Land development was undertaken by the contractor Aarsleff A/S as a 
turnkey contract and with Tscherning as sub-contractor. The detailed design 
and the construction work were contracted as design-build. After a pre-
qualification round, six contractors were selected for participation in the 
limited tender in the period 15 March 2010 – 17 May 2010. The selection of 
contractor was based on economically most advantageous tender and 
followed the European regulation on public tendering (Official Journal of the 
European Union, 2004). The contractor E. Pihl & Søn A/S won the tender. 
Part of the tendering requirement was an obligation for the contractor to take 
over the consultancy team from 3XN A/S and Orbicon/Leif Hansen 
Rådgivende Ingeniører A/S. Later the contractor Pihl & Søn A/S was 
nominated as contractor for the second phase of the UN City, following 
negotiations. Although the extension was put out for tender, the tender 
process was cancelled due to too high bids from the tenderers (Haugbølle et 
al., 2012 and 2013). 
The complexity of the project 
According to Hobday (1998b: 691), complexity of complex products and 
systems (CoPS) can be measured along 16 variables. The case has been 
analysed along these 16 variables as shown below: 
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Figure 16. Analysis of complexity of the case of the UN City (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
Unit cost/financial scale of project: Score – very high 
The building costs for the UN City have not been reported in sum, but the 
building costs for the warehouse were expected to be around DKK 450 
million, the building cost of phase 1 of Campus 1 was expected to be around 
DKK million and phase 2 of Campus 1 was expected to be around DKK280 
million. The total annual operating and lease costs for both facilities were 
estimated to DKK116.4 million (2010 prices) and a one-off payment of 
DKK70 million. An additional annual operating and lease cost of DKK30 
million (2011 prices) was expected for the second phase of the UN City from 
2014 onwards (Udenrigsministeriet, 2010 & 2011). Thus, the financial scale 
and time horizon of the project is very significant. 
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – very high 
This is a one-off project, never to be repeated again. 
Degree of technological novelty: Score – high  
A unique and advanced design coupled with a range of new technologies 
and solutions have been applied in this project. These novel solutions reside 
along a number of standard solutions. 
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – high 
Sophisticated software and hardware solutions have been applied in building 
management systems, installing electricity supply through photovoltaic 
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panels and not least in establishing security measures, due to the risk of 
terrorist acts. 
Quantity of sub-systems and components: Score – high 
Due to the size of the project as one of the largest office buildings in 
Denmark, there are a high number of sub-systems and components installed 
in the building. 
Degree of customisation of components: Score – high 
Many components, sub-systems etc. are fairly conventional and well-known 
in order to cut costs. However, a number of cost-driving components, like the 
solar shading system, the stairway in the hallway etc., are specifically 
customised to this particular building. 
Degree of customisation of final system: Score – very high 
The design of the building is unique. The original design of the building as a 
“snake” in the master plan and local plan was completely remade into the 
star-shaped form when the design team faced serious challenges with 
daylight supply, and new members entered the design team with new ideas. 
Complexity and choice of system architecture: Score – high  
The system architecture is more complex than typical due to the star-shaped 
design of the building, the size of the project and the special requirements 
for security etc. 
Quantity of alternative component design paths: Score – very high  
A number of solutions like the stairway, the solar shading system and the 
overall design have gone through several more alternative designs than is 
customary. Add to this the complete redesign of the overall architectural 
form of the building.  
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score – high 
Extensive feedback loops have been required during the project, but still 
within the usual framework of the phase-model for building projects. 
Variety of distinct knowledge bases: Score – very high 
A large range of distinct knowledge bases have been included in the project 
such as architectural expertise, a broad range of different engineering fields, 
manufacturing expertise, extensive construction management experience 
and expertise in logistics. 
Variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – very high 
The required skills and engineering inputs have included all customary types 
of engineering plus additional skills related security specialists and to water 
management due to the harbour location. 
Intensity of user involvement: Score – medium 
The actual users are a diverse group of UN organisations. Their input has 
been supported by a specially appointed consultancy team. However, their 
actual involvement has been filtered through an arms-length principle. The 
arms-length distance to the actual users has fostered uncertainty and 
prolonged response times in the decision-making process. 
Uncertainty/change in user requirements: Score – high 
The composition of the demand side has been highly complex, as described 
above, with a number of UN organisations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
leaseholder, By & Havn as client etc. While most of the requirements have 
been relatively ordinary requirements for office work spaces, a range of user 
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requirements with regard to security, energy performance, compliance with 
the LEED certification scheme etc. have been out of the ordinary. 
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score – high 
Most of the suppliers have played a fairly conventional role as suppliers, 
although the security issues have caused challenges with respect to 
logistics. Some suppliers have been intensively involved, for example Viking 
Markiser – the manufacturer of the solar shading panels. 
Intensity of regulatory involvement: Score – very high 
Public regulation has played a significant role in this project due to the 
establishment of the client organisation as a partnership between the 
municipality and the government (By & Havn), the development of the area 
(an Act of Parliament), the financial framework (lease holder is the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) and the approvals from the municipality e.g. of the design 
of the solar shading system. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
effectively the leaseholder and paying a substantial annual lease, the budget 
has been debated and approved in the Standing Committee on Finance in 
the Danish Parliament. Indirectly, the Building Regulations have also played 
a significant role in setting requirements for e.g. energy.  
Type of contract 
The types of contracts in play in this project include: 
– With regard to the master plan: The international competition was 
followed by a consultancy contract with the winning consortium. 
– With regard to the architect competition: Prizes were provided for the 
winners. 
– With regard to the project execution, two types of contracts were applied:  
– General consultancy contract according to ABR89. 
– “Controlled” design-build contract according to ABT93. 
– During the operational phase: A lease contract. 
Organisational structure 
Figure 17 provides an organisational overview of the interface between the 
building project and the operational system based on Geyer & Davies 
(2000). The building project is at the left-hand side and the operational 
system is at the right-hand side.  
 
DESIGN MAINTENANCESYSTEMS INTEGRATIONMANUFACTURING OPERATION
PROJECT
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BY & HAVN
UN OFFICES
MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANISH 
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PIHL & SØN
LEIF HANSEN/ORBICON
USER CONSULTANTS
VIKING MARKISER
DANISH BUILDING AND 
PROPERTY AGENCY
 
Figure 17. Project-system interfaces in the UN City. 
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Monitoring process 
The monitoring process follows the typical monitoring and control 
procedures of construction projects both internally in participating firms and 
externally with regard to the authorities. On top of these typical procedures, 
the construction project is also subject to the usual control and monitoring 
procedures mandatory to public construction projects financed by the 
standing committee on finances of the Danish Parliament. In addition, the 
project has been developed and scrutinised according to the American 
LEED certification scheme as well as the European Green Building scheme. 
Results 
As has been emphasised by the Swedish Engineering Academy (IVA, 1997) 
the client side of construction can be understood as a nodal point with 
relations to four different groups of actors: 1) the construction industry, 2) the 
regulatory system, 3) the users, and 4) the building owner. As argued by 
Haugbølle et al. (2012 and 2013), this case has illustrated the complex and 
emergent character of the demand side in construction: multiple user 
organisations (in this case eight UN organisations), extensive role separation 
(such as owner of building rights, developer, construction client, building 
owner, financier, user, tenant, leaseholder and letting office) along with 
overlapping roles between the regulatory system and the business element 
(the double role of the City of Copenhagen as both authority and part owner 
of the developing company), and repeatedly changes in the ownership 
structure over time.  
 In terms of the roles and responsibilities of the Danish client, the agency 
is enacted by a private developer, which is fully owned by the government 
and the City of Copenhagen as a partnership (in Danish “interessentskab” 
abbreviated I/S). As the largest land owner and developer of a vast number 
of the most attractive sites in Copenhagen, CPH City Port and Development 
I/S plays a crucial role in the development of Copenhagen. Although the 
developer is publicly owned and has to comply with a range of public 
regulations (e.g. on public tendering procedures), the company is effectively 
operating as a private company. It is required by law to carry out its activities 
on a commercial basis, for example through the sale of building rights. 
Although the board of CPH City Port and Development I/S is appointed by 
the government and city, the developer is operating at arm’s length from the 
political system without the usual direct democratic control of public 
organisations and with a more narrow commercial scope (Haugbølle et al., 
2012 and 2013). 
 With regard to the supply side, the various services have been delivered 
by separate parties with individual contracts: financing was obtained through 
arrangements with private investors, and construction was done by 
consultants and contractors. In this respect, the execution of the building 
project followed fairly traditional pathways. Further, the operation of the 
facility is expected to follow a traditional course as a lease contract with the 
Danish Building and Property Agency (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
This case represents one type of delivery system for mobilising private 
financing of public services. It is an example of an organisational innovation 
as defined by OECD & Eurostat (2005: 51): “An organisational innovation 
“…is the implementation of a new organisational method in the firm’s 
business practices, workplace organisation or external relations”. The project 
also showed other types of innovations, notably the emergence of the 
product innovation of a new advanced solar shading system. 
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Governance mechanisms 
Turning towards governance, the governance processes of policy, business 
and learning within and around the project will be characterised in line with 
the model developed by Haugbølle et al. (2012) based on the work of Gann 
& Salter (2000).  
 The policy processes predominantly take place between the regulatory 
and institutional framework on one hand, and businesses on the other hand. 
The first policy process is related to the provision of public goods by 
reference to broader national objectives towards international competition. In 
the Danish case, the political ambition of maintaining and expanding 
Copenhagen as the sixth largest location for UN activities was one of the 
driving forces behind the establishment of the UN City. The second policy 
process is related to the commodification of public goods through the 
establishment of a legally binding framework for exploiting the building rights 
in the Northern Harbour based on a specific Parliamentary Act, which was 
supplemented by local provisions based on the Planning Act. A third policy 
process is concerned with the privatisation of public policies through the 
establishment of a partnership between the government and the City. The 
establishment of a partnership between the government and the City by a 
Parliamentary Act led to the formation of a fully publicly owned development 
organisation, which operates on a commercial basis to provide public goods. 
In this way, public authorities are effectively relegating decision-making 
authority to private actors. As such, the partnership between the government 
and the municipality is the epitome of what Pedersen et al. (1992) have 
coined the privatisation of public politics (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013). 
 The business processes across both the property market and the 
construction market are characterised by differences and similarities along 
1) ownership, 2) cash flows, and 3) contractual forms. First, the time of 
ownership in the Danish case is in principle infinite. However, the contract 
period of the lease is limited to 15 years and 25 years, respectively, for 
Campus 1 and Campus 2. Second, financing is provided through the sale of 
building rights to private investors, who can (and did) pass on the ownership 
to new investors. The contractual arrangements of building the facility are 
very typical of conventional procurement. The subsequent operation and 
maintenance is financed through the rent paid by the lease-holder, which 
was enacted through an appropriation in the standing committee on finance 
of the Danish Parliament. Third, the case study has illuminated the 
reproduction of typical business relations between the actors in the building 
process. Despite the complexity on the demand side, and the extraordinary 
security and confidentiality issues involved in building for the United Nations, 
the procurement procedures have been fairly conventional in their 
application of a design contract and a subsequent design-build contract. Part 
of the tendering requirement included the obligation that the winning 
contractor take over the contract with the design team in what may be 
labelled a “controlled design-build” contract (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 
2013). 
 The learning processes points at two observations related to 1) direct 
learning from academia, and 2) the importance of international lessons. 
First, the case illustrates that direct learning and interaction with academia 
hardly took place at all in the actual construction project. Second, learning 
from international expertise played an important role. International 
certification schemes on sustainability like the American LEED system and 
the European Green Building charter have played a prominent role in the 
design of the UN City (Haugbølle et al., 2012 and 2013).  
The performance process and the value to the end users 
With regard to performance measurement in relation to society, the UN City 
has been instrumental in securing the continued location of the UN 
agencies. At the level of the operational system, the developer achieved 
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certification as the first Danish Green Building Partner. It is also likely – but 
difficult to quantify – that the developer made a profit on the sale of the UN 
City. On a project level, the ambition was to secure at least Gold in the 
LEED certification scheme, but the project even managed to achieve 
Platinum. For the users, their new office building provides them with a 
common and shared facility, which can support increased knowledge 
exchange and networking across the various UN organisations. 
Case 3: Client-supplier partnership: Green Lighthouse 
The context  
Green Lighthouse was designed and built as a demonstration project to 
showcase Danish competences within energy up to the United Nations COP 
15 climate summit held in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
 The building was designed for, and is used by, the Faculty of Science at 
the University of Copenhagen to service students with career guidance, 
information about exams, courses, etc. Furthermore the building is used as a 
meeting place for researchers and others associated with the faculty. The 
building is a 950 m2 circular green building. The building was designed and 
built to meet the requirements of low-energy class 1 (BR08) and it was 
Denmark's first public CO2-neutral building. Green Lighthouse came into 
being on the basis of a close public-private strategic partnership between 
Copenhagen University, the Danish Building & Property Agency (client), The 
City of Copenhagen, VELUX and VELFAC.  
The procurement characteristics  
The strategic partnership established a steering committee to manage the 
development of the partnership's shared vision of Green Lighthouse. They 
created a mutual contract between the parties, including an agreement of 
how possible conflicts should be managed in the partnership if they arose. 
The partnership together developed the programme for the building. 
 The programme addressed three different aspects in which the partners 
involved wanted to illustrate new possibilities related to 1) the building as a 
good example of a CO2-neutral building based on existing technologies and 
knowhow, 2) new types of PPPs and 3) the green campus buildings as an 
example of how a green building does not conflict with architectural, 
functional and indoor-climate qualities (Green Lighthouse, 2013). 
 The parties played different roles in the partnership: 
– The Danish Building & Property Agency /The Ministry of Science, 
Innovation and Higher Education were the client on Green Lighthouse 
and own the building .The Danish Building & Property Agency managed 
the construction project and participated in the process of defining 
requirements for the energy concept and architecture of the building. 
– Copenhagen University represented the users of Green Lighthouse. 
Copenhagen University was one of the initiators behind Green 
Lighthouse, and Copenhagen University participated in the process of 
defining requirements for the building. The University pays the standard 
rent for use of the Green Lighthouse. 
– The City of Copenhagen participated as an active partner in the process 
and this collaboration has ensured effective regulatory treatment in the 
construction process.  
– VELUX and VELFAC have been "vision partners" in the partnership, and 
the companies contributed with expert skills as well as technologies and 
products. The companies were selected due to their business area and 
they were already deeply involved in both product development of new 
products to meet future requirements for buildings as strategy work in 
relation to defining future requirements. The companies participated in the 
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process of defining requirements as well the energy concepts such as the 
indoor climate and daylight in the building. VELUX has also served as the 
project manager for the steering committee. 
 
The construction project was offered as a turnkey project and a contract was 
signed with a consortium consisting of Hellerup Byg as turnkey contractor, 
Christensen and Co. Architects A / S as architects and COWI as engineer. 
The contract included an agreement on commissioning and operating the 
building for the first year. 
 The cost of building Green Lighthouse was DKK 37 million. The Ministry 
of Science, Innovation and Higher Education paid DKK 33 million. The 
VELUX Group and VELFAC provided development work and components. 
Various components were furthermore provided by WindowMaster, Faber, 
Rockwool, Veksø, Knauf and Danogips. 
The complexity of the project 
The complexity addressed three issues: technical, organisational and use. 
 The organisation of the demonstration project was complex since the role 
of the building component suppliers changed from being suppliers for the 
construction project to being strategic partners with the public client in. This 
required establishing new organisational structures and integrating different 
actor perspectives in the development of the construction programme.   
 The public-private partners had an ambitious vision regarding energy 
performance, quality of light and indoor-climate, as well as architectural 
design, and this vision brought together new building components, new and 
different technical solutions and new design solutions that had to be 
integrated in the building to fulfil the vision. The buildings function as part of 
a university and as a demonstration-building made it difficult to predict the 
use of the building. This influenced the design of the capacity of the different 
technical solutions regarding energy use and indoor climate. Following 
Hobday’s (1998: 690) description, we can draw up a characterization of the 
complexity of the Green Lighthouse case accordingly (5 is ‘very high’, 
whereas 1 is ‘very low’): 
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Figure 18. Complexity of the Green Lighthouse case (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
Unit cost / financial scale of project: Score – very low  
The building costs are small.   
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – medium 
This is a one-off project, never to be repeated again, but different 
aspects/solutions have inspired others constructions projects and in this way 
repeated.    
Degree of technological novelty: Score – very high 
Technological novelty is high because of new architectural design, new 
building components and different technical solutions. Furthermore all the 
different parts are integrated due to high expectation to energy- light- and 
indoor climate performance.  
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – medium 
The extent of embedded software in product is not known, but it is expected 
that specific solutions might have a high extent of embedded software, and 
also the control system can be based on advanced software. However it is 
well known software components. 
Quantity of sub-systems and components: Score – very high 
The quantity of sub-systems and components are high due to the use of 
many different technical systems. 
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Degree of customisation of components: Score – medium 
Average. Although, each technical solution has to be adapted to fit client 
needs standard components have been used.   
Degree of customisation of final system: Score – very high 
The building is designed to meet the university's specific needs.   
Complexity and choice of system architectures: Score – very high 
Integration between architectural design and different energy-, light- and 
ventilation subsystems induces complexity.  
Quantity of alternative component design paths: Score – medium 
The challenge was to integrate the various technical solutions and design. 
With respect to this integration, there were several ways of doing this. 
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score – very high 
Continuous monitoring of actual energy consumption is used extensive to 
correct solutions and ensure that energy savings targets are met. 
Experience has been picked up and used by the partnership behind the 
project. 
Variety of distinct knowledge bases: Score – very high 
Low energy constructions solutions include a wide variety of distinct actors 
and knowledge bases.  
Variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – very high 
High due to the number of direct and indirect stakeholders that are part of 
the project on strategic as well as operational levels.  
Intensity of user involvement: Score – very high 
The users were represented in the partnership 
Uncertainty / change in user requirements: Score – very high 
Very high because of changes in use of the building. The building's use as a 
showcase was more extensive than planned and played a major role for the 
buildings energy performance.   
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score – very high 
Very high due to the establishment of the private public partnership. 
Intensity of regulatory involvement: Score – very high 
Very high: Firstly the building was designed to the requirements of low-
energy class 1 (BR08). Secondly the Danish Building & Property Agency 
/The Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education were the client on 
Green Lighthouse and own the building .The Danish Building & Property 
Agency managed the construction project and participated in the process of 
defining requirements for the energy concept and architecture of the 
building.  And thirdly the City of Copenhagen participated as an active 
partner in the process and this collaboration has ensured effective regulatory 
treatment in the construction process. 
Type of contract 
– The strategic partnership was established in December 2007 
– The strategic partnership contract was signed in March 2008 
– The architectural competition was launched in March 2008 
– The turnkey contract with the winner consortium was signed in July 2008   
– Development project in response to the applied technologies  
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Organisational structure 
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Figure 19. Project-system interfaces in the Green Lighthouse project. 
Monitoring process  
The public-private partnership behind Green Lighthouse evaluated the 
building’s energy performance, indoor climate and sustainability. 
 The building was built as a demonstration project and the public-private 
partnership behind Green Lighthouse all had an interest in following up on 
the project's objectives in relation to the building's performance, process and 
solutions. The building's energy consumption, including the different 
technical solutions (heat pump solution, combined with solar energy, 
borehole storage and district heating coupling), were monitored in operation 
over a three-year and the building’s actual performance and expected 
performance were compared. Experience with both the process of 
commissioning the technical systems and the use of the building was 
included in this monitoring process. This systematic monitoring of energy 
consumption was conducted in an EUDP project in a group consisting of 
COWI, the Danish Building & Property Agency, Copenhagen University and 
Velux. 
 The building's sustainability was subsequently assessed through 
certification of the building by LEED, where it achieved LEED Gold and by 
DGNB, where it achieved DGNB bronze. 
 When construction was completed under a traditional turnkey contract, 
the monitoring points used in relation to the construction project were those 
usually applied.  
Results 
Energy consumption was found to be much higher than expected in the first 
year in operation. Several reasons were identified. Firstly, it had been 
difficult to plan the use of the building. As a demonstration project, the 
building has been such a success that the number of guests has been much 
higher than estimated. Secondly, an error in the execution phase meant that 
a damper was missing in the natural ventilation system, which had a major 
impact on the energy consumption until the fault was identified and 
corrected. It could have been difficult to find this fault, if monitoring of the 
building had not been systematic. Furthermore, half of the solar cells were 
not connected. Thirdly, it was complicated to get all the different technical 
systems to work together and it took longer than expected to run-in the 
system. At the same time the initial adjustment of the system required high 
technical skills. The turnkey contract included an agreement on 
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commissioning and operating the building for the first year and it would have 
been difficult to adjust the technical system without this agreement.  
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
The close public-private partnerships between the public client, the users 
and the suppliers, resulted in a situation in which the suppliers changed role 
from suppliers to the construction project to drivers of the project together 
with the client and user in the programme phase. In this case the partnership 
has had the role as system integrator. This had an impact on the innovation 
structures that were going on in the project as the key feedback processes in 
the project was established between the expected energy consumption 
(design phase) and the actual energy consumption (use phase). These 
feedback processes has subsequently led to the discovery of errors in the 
construction phase and provided significant input and adjustment on both 
the design work and product development. A key learning from the case is 
that this type of partnership can contribute to both the system design phase 
and the subsequent phase of development where systems are upgraded 
and modified in the CoPS perspective. 
Governance mechanisms 
In the case a prominent governance process was politicization of the 
industry-business processes. Firstly the involvement of the suppliers in the 
partnership impacted the design process itself, as the visions of the 
suppliers played a major role, with strong focus on daylight, passive energy 
from the sun and indoor climate. Secondly this influenced the following up 
activities in the operation phase, as the suppliers had a strong interest in 
both energy performance and indoor climate; they were keen to follow up 
these aspects as part of product development. 
The performance process and the value to the end users 
Lessons learned from the performance perspective were firstly that it can be 
very difficult to predict the use of buildings in terms of both time scale and 
number of users. This has an impact on energy design and installations, etc. 
and the ability to establish energy performance objectives. 
 Secondly, it is very important to integrate adjustment and operation of 
technical systems for a period in the contract because of the complexity of 
the whole energy system and as a way to find design and construction 
errors. Error detection will be very difficult for the ordinary operating 
managers.  
Case 4: PPP: National Institute of Sport and Physical Education 
The context 
INSEP (National Institute of Sport and Physical Education) brings together a 
large number of top-level athletes specialising in a wide range of sports. The 
Institute is located in the Bois de Vincennes forest west of Paris, and it is the 
training centre for the French sports elite. About half of the medals gained by 
French athletes at the Olympic Games (16 out of 33 in 2004, 21 out of 40 in 
2008 and 19 out of 34 in 2012) were won by athletes trained at INSEP. 
In 2005, the Ministry of Sport decided to renovate INSEP in order to 
modernise the site. 
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Figure 20. The building hosting the director. Photo: Frédéric Bougrain 
 
Figure 21. Athletic tracks. Photo: Frédéric Bougrain. 
 
Figure 22. Cycling tracks. Photo: Frédéric Bougrain. 
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The procurement characteristics 
Two different public procurement schemes were used: 
1 The renovation of the southern section was carried out under a public 
management contract. The Ministry of Sport was the client since it was 
the best actor to deal with the risks associated with the management of 
the sports facilities. 
2 A public-private partnership tender proposal was retained for the 
renovation, maintenance and operation of the northern section. Since it 
was crucial that the delivery deadline was set to enable the preparation 
of athletes for the 2008 – 2012 Olympiad, and the complexity of the 
renovation was high, a partnership contract was considered as the most 
appropriate solution. The case focuses on this second procurement 
process. 
 
Before choosing this second solution for the northern section, the public 
authorities had to prove that it offered value for money. A comparison with 
the conventional public procurement process option was necessary. The 
cost of the deal was about 8 % less than the cost of continuing public sector 
provision. Moreover the risks of cost overruns and of longer delivery times 
were higher for traditional procurements. 
 Finally, since the delivery deadline set to enable the preparation of 
athletes for the 2008 – 2012 Olympic Games was crucial and the complexity 
of the renovation was high, a partnership contract was considered the most 
appropriate solution. 
The complexity of the project 
The transfer of design, build, finance and operation to private sector partners 
and the multiplicity of services (hospitality, catering, cleaning, security, waste 
management, maintenance and operation of buildings and coordination of 
these services) increased project complexity since interfaces between 
stakeholders, organisations and project phases were multiplied. Moreover, it 
was required to maintain the building in operation during the renovation. 
 Complexity is analysed along the framework proposed by Hobday (1998) 
as illustrated in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Complexity of the INSEP case (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
Financial scale of project: Score – very high  
The project was the first large PPP projects launched at the national level. 
The financial arrangement was very complex (in every PPP project there is a 
mix between debt and equity – usually, about 90% of the project is paid with 
debt and the remaining part through capital). INSEP had to benefit from the 
help of financial consultants. 
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – very high 
This is a unique project. Moreover, since it was a renovation, the private 
operator had to take into account the constraints of the existing buildings. 
Degree of technological novelty/ quantity of sub-systems and components/ degree of 
customisation of components: Score –low 
The organisation of the project was innovative. However, there was no 
technological innovation in the project. Components were mainly 
conventional and not in huge quantity. 
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – medium  
Software is mainly limited to the help desk and a centralised control station. 
These systems are at the core of the service level agreement. 
Degree of customisation of final system: Score – high  
This is a unique project. The result was obtained after three rounds of 
competitive dialog. 
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Complexity and choice of system architectures: Score – high  
Complexity is due to the renovation. The architect was constrained by the 
existing buildings which forced him to be innovative. 
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score – medium  
During the renovation phase, feedback loops were limited despite the 
integration of design, construction and operation within the same team. 
Variety of distinct knowledge bases / variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – 
very high  
The consortium gathers several leading companies in their own field 
(hospitality, catering, construction, facility management). 
Intensity of user involvement: the competitive dialog was a strong 
opportunity for INSEP to present its needs. Moreover, the flexibility of the 
contract allowed some adaptations. 
Uncertainty/change in user involvement: Score – high 
Despite the formal contract signed between partners, several changes 
occurred during the renovation and operation of the buildings in order to 
integrate new user requirements. Moreover, during the renovation phase, 
asbestos was found in one building. 
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score –very low 
Suppliers were not really involved in the project 
Intensity of regulatory involvement: Score – high 
Regulation is very strong in the building industry. The novelty of the new 
PPP procedure increased the complexity of the project. Moreover, regulation 
concerning the access of handicap people has been strengthened. 
Type of contract 
– The partnership contract was awarded in December 2006; 
– The contract concerned the renovation, maintenance and operation of the 
buildings for the thirty years of the contract and the delivery of services 
(hotels, catering, cleaning…). It was signed between the Ministry and a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The renovation costs reached EUR 102 
million and the annual unitary payment was EUR 12 million. The 
renovation works started in June 2007 and ended in January 2010 ; 
– Output specifications were integrated in the contract in order to monitor 
the consortium. 
– Within the consortium, the company in charge of hospitality, coordinated 
the helpdesk but it did not have any authority over the other members of 
the consortium. 
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Organisational structure 
 
Figure 24. Organisational diagram 
Monitoring process 
To monitor the consortium, output specifications were integrated into the 
contract. However some monitoring procedures were not adapted. At the 
beginning, it took more than half a day to monitor the quality of the cleaning. 
Therefore both parties agreed to modify their approach. The number of key 
performance indicators (KPI) was reduced from 276 to 153 in order to 
improve the efficiency of the monitoring procedure and to enforce the 
contract. 
 Users report issues to an onsite helpdesk. Then, the appropriate service 
team is mobilised by the private partner. Demands have to be satisfied 
within a certain time limit which depends on the significance of the part of the 
buildings concerned. For example, significance is high for the restaurant and 
the medical pole but medium for offices and low for rooms. Penalties are 
higher the more central they are to the delivery of services which are 
considered as significant by INSEP. They apply when the private partner is 
not able to react in time or in the event of repeated errors. This helpdesk is 
the interface between the users and the facility managers. It also allows for 
records of response times and data on the pattern of operational errors. 
Results 
Despite the formal contract signed between the partners, several changes 
occurred during the renovation and operation of the buildings. The public 
authority tended to adopt the behaviour of traditional public owners: INSEP 
asked for new services once the partnership contract was awarded (e.g. a 
balneotherapy complex was created and the architecture of the R&D lab was 
modified after the enrolment of a new manager). 
 The construction was not completed on time because INSEP asked for 
several changes during the renovation. Moreover asbestos was found in one 
building. Under traditional public procurement, the works would have 
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stopped and the client would have modified the initial contract with the 
contractor. This modification of the initial contract is usually very time 
consuming and the contractor always tries to benefit from the bilateral 
negotiation. In this project, the contractor who was member of the 
consortium decided to take the risk (while nothing about this risk was 
mentioned in the initial contract) and to pursue the renovation works. At the 
end, the delay was one month. Despite a delay of one month, INSEP was 
very satisfied since the budget was not modified. Moreover, it was aware 
that such a result would never have been attained under traditional public 
procurement procedures. 
 Once the renovation had been completed, some contractual services 
appeared to be not adapted to the day-to-day life of the residents. 
Consequently services were modified but the financial perimeter of the 
contract was kept unchanged. There were no financial consequences, but 
according to the private consortium, most changes were time consuming. 
 All actors also indicated that the service quality is now better than before. 
For example the mail desk is open from 8 am to 10 pm instead of 7 am to 
noon and 2 pm to 5 pm. The reception desk also lengthened its opening 
hours. New services were created for people who come to INSEP for short 
training periods (such as a luggage room).  
 Despite this positive feedback, some elements of dissatisfaction remain. 
The contract is interpreted differently by the stakeholders. Firstly this is due 
to a change of employees within INSEP. People who took part in the 
competitive dialogue and in signing the contract had left INSEP. Secondly 
the output specification was not always well specified. 
 Budgets for maintenance and operation are also limited because the 
public authority (INSEP) had no experience in this field and in the past had 
had a very limited budget dedicated to these tasks. Finally it also appears 
that the interface between the contractor and the system operators (two 
different companies belonging to the same large French contractor) was not 
very efficient. Due to a lack of experience in similar projects and to the 
penalties associated with construction delays, the contractor strongly 
focused on the delivery of the buildings. Moreover, the system operator did 
not have any incentive to adopt a whole life cycle cost approach. This was 
due to a serious lack of data for technical equipment and to the separation 
between construction and operation within the consortium. Indeed, the input 
of the division in charge of maintenance and operation was not sought by 
the construction team located in a different division. 
 Maintenance is also lacking since the company in charge of maintenance 
and operation did not realise that it would have to operate the building 24/7. 
Moreover, some renovation activities are still ongoing in the Southern 
section of the INSEP campus. Thus, the private company in charge of 
cleaning the buildings has to work more than expected because most people 
living and working on the site tend to bring dust and mud inside the 
buildings. 
 Changes during the construction phase have also an impact on the 
performance of the contract. For example the private consortium had 
incentives to operate buildings and manage systems in order to reduce 
energy consumption. However, INSEP asked for new services (e.g. 
balneotherapy and TVs in the rooms of the athletes). Thus, the reference 
base had to be redefined before developing any energy performance 
mechanisms. 
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
No technical innovation was developed during the project. This shows the 
influence of shareholders and debt funders who cannot accept any delay 
during the construction phase. Indeed, delays would postpone the receipt of 
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rental income. However, the novelty of the procedure contributed to the 
creation of organisational innovation. At the end of the construction, INSEP 
did not have staff available to measure service delivery performance. 
However, two people were recruited to supervise the private partner. VINCI 
also intended to modify its organisation for future PPP contracts in order to 
avoid divisional silos. 
Governance mechanisms 
In long-term contracts, all events cannot be anticipated. There are always 
unexpected events. In this case, such events were due both to the novelty of 
the procurement process and the difficulty for public authorities (INSEP and 
the Ministry) to propose a clear output specification for services. However 
thanks to some flexibility during the operational period, it was possible to 
integrate new service requirements. Several supplementary clauses were 
signed to adapt the contract to the needs of the user. 
The performance process and the value to the end users 
Among the companies involved in the project, the general contractor and the 
operator (VINCI) took large risks. Information on building structures was 
imperfect and there was asbestos in one building. This was due to INSEP’s 
poor knowledge of the condition of its buildings. Despite this situation, delays 
were respected. Moreover, the company in charge of maintenance and 
operation had to face the imprecision of the contract and the new 
requirements of the public partner. This illustrates the difficulty for the public 
users to think in terms of service delivery. This company also did not have 
information on users’ behaviour. It discovered during the first years of the 
contract that the athletes hosted in the dormitories were not traditional 
students. Companies in charge of catering (CASINO) and hospitality 
(ACCOR) did not have to face similar unexpected events. This is also due to 
the fact that services are the core business of these companies while for a 
company such as VINCI this was the beginning of a new activity. These 
elements explain why the contract has not really been profitable for VINCI. 
 There is a strong paradox in this project. The team managing INSEP 
considers that the service quality is not as good as expected. However, all 
occupants indicate that the situation is much better than in the past. 
Similarly, former champions who had the opportunity to visit the Institute 
where they had previously trained, consider that the facilities are really 
outstanding. This tends to prove that public asset management was very 
poor at INSEP for many years. One advantage of such a contract is to 
reduce the ability of the public authority to reduce operational expenditures 
and to fail in the long run to properly manage its asset. 
Case 5: Energy Saving Performance Contract: 18 high schools 
The context 
Region Centre is a political administration gathering six French counties. It 
owns high schools and is in charge of operating them. As the owner of 
properties gathering 106 high schools (95% of its assets), Region Centre 
aims at reducing energy consumption for two reasons: 
1 To contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 
2 To reduce its energy bill. 
 
An audit was launched in 2008 to find out more about the energy 
consumption of each high school, the efficiency of heating equipment and 
the quality of building facades. Thus, energy issues became part of the 
culture of this administration. This knowledge allowed better asset 
management. Thirty high-schools were selected on criteria such as high 
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energy consumption, poor building quality and no ongoing investment to 
improve energy performance. 
The procurement characteristics 
Two different public procurement schemes were possible: PPP and 
traditional public procurement. 
 The public-private partnership tender proposal was retained for the 
renovation, maintenance and operation of 18 high schools. Since the 
complexity of the renovation was high and the Region expected a life cycle 
cost approach and performance-based approach, a partnership contract was 
considered as the most appropriate solution. 
 Before choosing PPP, public authorities had to prove that it offered value 
for money. A comparison with the conventional public procurement process 
option was necessary. The cost of the deal was less than the cost of 
continuing public sector procurement. Moreover the risks for cost overruns 
and for longer delivery time were more pronounced for traditional public 
procurement. 
The complexity of the project 
The complexity was threefold: technical, organisational and financial: 
1 None of the 18 high schools were similar (different architectural style, 
different year of completion…). One of them was even classified as an 
historical building. Consequently, the implementation of technical 
solutions was very diverse. Moreover, the public authority wanted to 
implement renewable energy. Finally, some technical data were lacking 
(such as the length of the building facades); 
2 The organisation of the renovation was also complex since the high 
schools were occupied. Most of the works had to be done during 
holidays since it was not possible to disturb classes. Some directors of 
high schools were also against PPP. They did not want to see private 
operators replacing public servants. 
3 The aim was also to develop a performance-based contract. However, 
Region Centre was not familiar with this type of approach. 
 
The public administration benefited from the assistance of several 
consultants before, during and after the competitive dialogue, since it was 
using the partnership contract for the first time. 
 Complexity is analysed along the framework proposed by Hobday (1998) 
as illustrated in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Complexity of the EPSC case. (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
Financial scale of project: Score – very high  
The project was one of the first energy saving performance contract. The 
financial arrangement was very complex. The project was financed with a 
mix between debt and equity. Local public authorities had to benefit from the 
support of lawyers and financial consultants. 
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – very high 
The operator had to renovate and improve the energy performance of 18 
high schools presenting different architectural characteristics. Each 
renovation was specific to the buildings. Moreover, the energy target is 
different for every school. 
Degree of technological novelty: Score – very high  
The internet energy platform, the help desk and the centralised control 
station were conventional but specific to this project. Moreover, the core 
business of the private company (EIFFAGE) was in construction. Operating 
and optimising energy systems were new activities. To fulfil its tasks, the 
company had to develop new software. In some high schools classified as 
historical building, specific technical solutions had to be developed. 
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – very high  
Several sensors were used to check the temperature of the high schools in 
use (classrooms, dormitories, offices, houses, laboratories, and gymnasium). 
The help desk and a centralised control station are the backbone of the 
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ECSP. Specific software were develop in order to monitor energy 
consumptions. 
Quantity of sub-systems and components/ degree of customisation of components: 
Score – medium 
Several sensors were used to monitor energy consumptions. Components 
were mainly conventional. 
Degree of customisation of final system: Score – very high  
This is a unique project. The contract was the result of three rounds of 
competitive dialog involving the leading companies in the field of energy 
saving. 
Complexity and choice of system architectures: Score – medium  
The architect had a limited role compared with the design office. However, 
two high schools were classified as historical buildings. Consequently, 
renovation and insulation works were done under strong constraints. 
Innovative solutions had to be developed to respect architectural constraints. 
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score –high  
Feedback loops were limited between renovation and operation teams. 
However, there are continuous feedbacks during the operation of the 
buildings in order to reduce energy consumptions and to reach the ambitious 
targets. 
Variety of distinct knowledge bases / variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – 
high to very high 
The ESPC was not only based on the optimisation of energy systems but 
also on the renovation of buildings and actions to increase the awareness of 
the users. Strong engineering skills were required in dynamic thermal 
modelling and simulation. 
Intensity of user involvement: Score – very high 
The user was involved through the competitive dialog. The operator also 
tries to involve the users during the operation of the building in order to 
reduce energy consumptions (through actions to promote environmental 
awareness). For example, users (students, professors …) are involved in 
communication activities (making of movies…). 
Uncertainty/change in user involvement: Score – high  
Once the contract was signed, change was limited and due to the reduction 
of subsidies for photovoltaic systems. The contractor also discovered 
asbestos in one building. 
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score – medium 
One supplier was involved in one high school classified as historical building. 
Specific windows were developed for the renovation of the facades. 
Intensity of regulatory involvement : Score – very high 
Regulation had a strong impact. It mainly concerns energy issues, security in 
high schools, accessibility for handicapped people, and subsidies for 
photovoltaic systems. 
Type of contract 
– The partnership contract was awarded in July 2010; 
– The contract concerned the renovation, maintenance and operation of 18 
high school buildings for fifteen years. The goal was to reduce energy 
consumption by 42% and greenhouse gas emissions by 58%. The total 
costs of the project reached EUR 80 million and the annual unitary 
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payment is EUR 5.2 million. After fifteen years, energy savings will not be 
enough to pay the investment. The renovation works started in August 
2010 and ended in December 2011 ; 
– The private consortium does not supply energy. Region Centre 
considered that it did not bring any added-value and it could have led to 
an increase of energy prices since it benefited from regulated prices. 
– The private consortium is also supposed to train at least one technician 
per high school (those who will be in contact with the public project 
manager) and to raise the awareness of the students of the high schools. 
– EIFFAGE was awarded the contract and two different subsidiaries of the 
group were in charge of renovation works and operation of the high 
schools. The architect and the design office were the main subcontractors 
of the building company. The role of the design office was to identify 
solutions that optimize energy savings. However, the risk was only 
supported by EIFFAGE. 
– Although renovation concerned energy systems, primary focus was on 
wall insulation. This was one of the reasons why EIFFAGE was selected. 
COFELY, its main competitor during the competitive dialogue, is more 
specialised in improving the efficiency of energy systems. 
Organisational structure 
 
Figure 26. Organisational diagram 
Monitoring process 
To monitor the consortium, the public authority is assisted by the consultants 
who assisted the Region during the competitive dialog. Twice a year the 
consultants have to write a report presenting how the operator is responding 
the demands of the users and whether he is respecting his contractual 
obligations (such as a minimum level of temperature in classes). They also 
help the Region when supplementary clauses are added to the initial 
contract. 
 Every high school is equipped with a centralised control station that 
allows the operator to watch over the performance and the optimisation of all 
the technical installations. It is also used to control all energy consumption 
units. Users also inform an Internet platform when temperatures are too low 
and equipment is failing. The technical agents working for the public 
authority do not always signal faults on the Internet platform. 
 The Region has underestimated the cost of the monitoring process. It has 
to double check the information provided by the private partner.  
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Results 
The contract proved to be flexible. Once it was awarded, renovation works 
were modified. Indeed, the French government decided to reduce subsidies 
for photovoltaic energy. Thus, Region Centre decided to cancel the 
installation of solar photovoltaic systems on the roof of some high schools. 
 The renovation was done on time. In one high school, the consortium 
found asbestos and it had to support the costs associated with this bad 
surprise. This contract forced the consortium to implement solutions that 
promote life cycle costs. 
 At the operational level, when a technical problem appears, the operator 
tends to be very reactive in order to avoid penalties. Most problems 
identified by the users are solved within 24 hours. In the past, problems 
tended to continue unresolved since the contracts with facility managers 
were short-term and not performance-based. 
 However, despite this reactivity, the technicians working for the high 
school consider that the operator only brings short-term answers. The 
operator never tries to understand why technical problems appear and then 
develop sustainable solutions. Most of the time the people who are 
employed by the high schools have more expertise since they have worked 
in the buildings for several years. 
 The training sessions delivered by the operator were not always adapted 
to the needs of the local employees. The operator was also not really able to 
raise the awareness of students. It collaborated with a local association 
since it considered that it had no competencies in this field. However, the 
local association did not provide the Region with reports on its actions. 
Moreover, professors did not like very much to see outsiders coming in the 
school. Thus, the collaboration stopped. 
 No satisfaction enquiry has been developed. Feedback is uneven. It 
depends on the high school. In old schools that were heavily refurbished, 
users are very satisfied (they were suffering from the heat during the 
summer and from the cold in winter time). Conversely, the impact of the 
renovation was smaller in schools built about 20 years ago. The users do not 
feel the improvement while they were disturbed by the renovation works for 
a whole year. Moreover, critics can be very strong when the level of comfort 
temperature has decreased. In the past, it was quite common to heat high 
schools up to 23 – 24 degrees. However, the contract indicates that the 
private consortium has to heat buildings to around 19 – 20 degrees. The 
operator tends to respect its obligations and to dissatisfy the users since he 
is penalized when energy consumption is too high. 
 The employees of the high schools frequently do not understand why the 
Region outsourced the operation of the buildings since they were satisfied 
by the work done by public employees. Similarly, the directors of high 
schools criticize this contract. They have the feeling that they are working 
more without receiving any financial compensation. 
 The private consortium is supposed to reduce the overall energy 
consumption by 42%. However, every high school has its own target and the 
consortium has to reach the target for each of them. A good result on one 
school cannot be compensated by a bad performance at another. When 
energy savings are not met, the consortium must pay the difference. 
Conversely, when the savings exceed the guaranteed performance, the 
gains are shared: 50% to the consortium, 25% to the Region itself and 25% 
to the Region to finance works aiming at improving the energy performance 
of the 18 high schools. 
 In the first year the bonus for the consortium was EUR 62 whereas it was 
EUR 80 000 for the Region. This is due to the way the gains are shared. 
During this first year, the consortium compensated the losses at high 
schools by half of the surplus, whereas the Region received only the surplus. 
In the second year, the performance was worst. The consortium had to pay 
about EUR 110 000 to the Region (savings were not met and the operator 
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was penalized for not responding in due time to the needs of some high 
schools). The consortium considers that its inability to reach the target is due 
to an error in establishing the energy baseline of two high schools. The 
energy used to heat the water was apparently not integrated in the baseline. 
The Region and the consortium are still examining this issue. 
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
The organisation of the project and the service provided are innovative. 
ESPC on such a scale are not widespread. Moreover, the renovation and 
the contractual energy performance are very specific to each school. 
There was also an attempt to implement life cycle cost solutions. This was 
the result of a strong focus on energy performance. However, the transition 
between building works (acceptance of work) and the operation of the high 
schools was not so good. This was the first experience of EIFFAGE in this 
field (the project was also its first ESPC and the aim was to learn from the 
project) and the two different business units (construction and operation) still 
have to learn to work together. 
Governance mechanisms 
The ESPC has considerably changed the role of the stakeholders of the 
project. Usually, the architect and the general contractor are the key players 
in a building project. In the design team, the architect had a limited role. The 
leader was the design office who was in charge of identifying the solutions 
that could optimise energy performance. Similarly, in the EIFFAGE group, 
the business unit in charge of optimising energy systems took the lead over 
the general contractor. The public authority had also to adopt a specific 
organisation in order to supervise and monitor the private partner. This 
monitoring process was much costly than expected. 
The performance process and the value to the end users 
These long-term contracts have to create value for the user in order to 
compensate for the investment costs. In this case, the public project 
manager estimated that the premium due to the spread between public and 
private financing rates cost about EUR 2 million extra. However, he 
considered that the Region will still benefit from this project and was right to 
adopt this procurement process, since similar renovation on such a scale 
and on time would not have been possible with traditional public 
procurement. Moreover, it would have been more difficult to have such a 
long-term performance-based contract. Moreover,, the private partner took 
large risks. The regional authorities did not provide him with information on 
users’ behaviour. Data on surfaces of building facades were lacking and the 
private partner discovered asbestos in one building. In traditional projects 
similar risks are never taken. This imprecision explains part of the difficulties 
to reach the expected energy target. 
Case 6: PPP: The police station of Strasbourg 
The context 
The police station of Strasbourg was built before the new law on public-
private partnership was enacted in June 2004. The aim was to gather 
together several services which were scattered throughout Strasbourg. It 
was also seen as a solution to combat insecurity in the city. 
 Several similar projects were supposed to be launched. However, only 
Strasbourg was financed. The aim of the Ministry of Interior was to use this 
project to learn more about private financing and facility management. 
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Figure 27. Police station of Strasbourg. Photo: Frédéric Bougrain. 
The procurement characteristics 
The procurement scheme was complex and this was the first time it was 
used by the Ministry of the Interior. In October 1997, SCIC development was 
selected as the preferred bidder and the architectural project was validated 
in January 1998. However, the Ministry of Finance stopped the procedure 
until December 1999. Indeed, it considered this procedure as inappropriate 
and too expensive in the long run. Finally, the contract was signed in June 
2000 for 25 years. The contract was a combination of a lease with a second 
formal contract indicating the rights of the occupant. Due to its position the 
Ministry could terminate the lease before 25 years. Under this contract, 
design, build, finance, major repairs and replacement were transferred to 
private-sector partners. 
 The facility was successfully delivered two months early in January 2002. 
The complexity of the project 
First, the multiplicity of services hosted in the police station increased project 
complexity. It multiplied interfaces between all services and project 
stakeholders. Moreover, each service had different requirements that were 
not always compatible with one another. For example, the police station has 
to host people who are held in custody and those who are complaining. Both 
are never supposed to cross each other. These elements increased the 
difficulty of the users to specify their requirements. 
 Second, the contractual scheme was so complex that it increased the risk 
borne by the investors. This risk was due to the possibility for the Ministry of 
Interior to terminate the lease. Since a police station is a very specific asset, 
investors feared they would be unable to find new occupants. 
 Complexity is analysed along the framework proposed by Hobday (1998) 
as illustrated in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Complexity of the Police station case. (5 is ‘very high’, whereas 1 is ‘very low’). 
Financial scale of project: Score – very high  
The contractual scheme was very complex (there was no procurement 
framework for PPP at this period) and it increased the risk borne by the 
investors. 
Product volume (Inverse of): Score – very high 
The contractor had to take into account the multiplicity of services hosted in 
the police station which increased project complexity. Moreover, several 
contract concern the delivery of services (cleaning, facility management, 
catering, phone reception…). These elements made the project unique. 
Degree of technological novelty: Score – low  
The organisation of the project was innovative. However, there was no 
technological innovation in the project. 
Extent of embedded software in product: Score – very high  
Several software are embedded in the building (the help desk and security 
systems). 
Quantity of sub-systems and components/ degree of customisation of components: 
Score – medium to high  
Components were mainly conventional. Since the building hosted several 
services that follow different goals, components were used in large quantity. 
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Degree of customisation of final system: Score – very high 
This is a unique project. It was the first and last police station built under this 
framework. 
Complexity and choice of system architectures: Score – high  
The interior architecture was complex since the police station gathered 
several services and hosted people who are held in custody and those who 
are complaining. 
Feedback loops from later to earlier stages: Score – medium  
Feedback loops were limited during the construction of the building. 
However, there are continuous exchanges between the facility manager and 
the users. 
Variety of distinct knowledge bases / variety of skill and engineering inputs: Score – 
high to very high 
The PPP concerns design, construction, operation and finance. Knowledge 
bases were diversified. Engineering input was quite strong particularly for 
software and security equipment. 
Intensity of user involvement: Score – low  
The output specification was not well defined. Public authorities had 
difficulties in defining their expectations and service levels. During the 
operation, the user did not know several times if he had to handle a problem 
or to ask the private owner or the operator. 
Uncertainty/change in user involvement: Score –high  
No change was made during the construction. During the operation, the 
organisation of the police stations was modified (some services moved). The 
uncertainty concerning the procurement process was also strong. Once in 
operation, the main change concerned the financial contract (the rent 
increase was limited). 
Intensity of other supplier involvement: Score – very low 
Suppliers were not really involved in the project. 
Intensity of regulatory involvement: Score – high  
The regulatory environment (security and thermal regulations, procurement 
process) influenced the development of the project and increased the 
complexity of the project. 
Type of contracts 
Two contracts were signed in December 1999 between the Ministry of the 
Interior and a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) gathering three financial 
institutions. The contracts concerned design, construction, finance, major 
repairs and maintenance of the police station for 25 years. Several separate 
contracts were also signed: 
– between the SPV and a developer; 
– a design and build contract between the developer and a team gathering 
a general contractor and an architect; 
– between the tenant and user of the building, and a facility manager(after 
the delegation of the SPV); 
 
The occupant also signed several small contracts for catering, cleaning, 
phone reception, outdoor areas. 
 The costs reached EUR 24 million. 
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Organisational structure 
 
Figure 29. Organisational diagram 
Monitoring process 
The monitoring process is contractually very loose. However, the syndic who 
represents the occupant was able to ask for supplementary services for the 
SPV. For example, he referred to the Civil Code to require regular building 
façade restoration. This evolution is due to the ability of the syndic to 
develop a relationship based on trust with the SPV. Moreover, it appears 
that the project was quite profitable for the investors in PFI. Thus, they were 
not reluctant to provide supplementary services. 
 However, the syndic representing the occupants deplores not being able 
to influence the allocation of resources for major repairs and replacement. 
He just monitors the use of the budget. 
 The contract with the facility manager is not performance-based. It is 
more a duty-based contract. In the event of poor maintenance, the syndic is 
not really able to penalize the facility manager. However, the relationship 
between partners is very good since the facility manager has always been 
able to comply with the demands of the occupants. 
Results 
Once the construction was completed, several problems appeared: 
– Difficulties were experienced by the public authority in clearly defining 
their expectations and service levels. Consequently, several parts of the 
police station were not well designed. For example the acoustics of the 
shooting gallery, the reception desk was too small and the acoustics in 
the reception hall were quite bad. People working there suffered from the 
echo. Thus, it was necessary to invest EUR 50 000 to improve the quality 
of the work station; 
– Ventilation did not work in some offices and when it did it was very noisy; 
– The pump for heating had to be replaced since it was not adapted to the 
size of the building; 
– The walls of the building started to crumble off after a few years; 
– Plumbing was quickly defective; 
– The paving stones had to be replaced because of a defect. 
 
These results are apparently due to budgetary constraints that appeared 
during the call for tenders. To reduce the budget, the Ministry lessened its 
expectations. 
 According to the occupant and the facility manager, the architect and the 
general contractor also did not know the specifics of a police station, and 
particularly the behaviour of the people working there or who go through the 
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place. For example, vandalism is quite frequent. Thus, equipment has to be 
robust. 
 The contract has been flexible during the operational period. The main 
change concerns the rent paid every year by the public tenant. The syndic 
considered that the financial charges were too high. This was due to the 
inappropriate risks that were transferred to the private sector before design 
and construction. The result was a higher risk premium charged to the public 
sector. For example, the rent rose from EUR 3,331,947 in 2002 to EUR 
4,180,052 in 2007. The syndic considered that this increase was obscene. 
Thus, in 2008, he negotiated a new gradual rent increase which was 
formerly based on the change in the index for construction costs. After 
negotiation, the shareholders of the SPV agreed to limit the increase to 
between 2.5 per cent and 4 per cent of the construction cost index. This 
included retrospectively 2007 and the shareholders refunded the occupants 
EUR 114,032. After this agreement, the rent is divided in two parts: the first 
concerns the financial rent (investment costs and financial charges) and the 
second maintenance and operating costs. 
Lessons learned 
Innovations 
The project was not very innovative. However, the contractual mechanism 
was completely new (there was no framework for PPP). At the national level, 
the Ministry learnt a lot from this project since it was the first experience with 
this new procedure that can be considered as a form of PPP. The Ministry 
realised that it had to raise its internal competences in facility management 
and in financial engineering. After this project, a project group was formed to 
develop output specifications for police stations. The person representing 
the syndic of the police station of Strasbourg was the head of this working 
group. Specifications are regularly updated to integrate changes in the 
regulation. 
 A new procurement framework was also established in 2003. This 
contributed to reducing the risks perceived by private investors. This 
framework integrates design, build and operate (DBO) and design, build, 
finance and operate (DBFO). The first case was more popular since local 
authorities (such as municipalities) finance part of the project (for example 
by offering the land). This approach reduces delivery costs. It usually takes 
around eight months between the description of the programme and the 
beginning of the building works, instead of 24 months with the traditional 
public procurement. 
 Moreover, the office in charge of managing the estate of the Ministry 
considers that PPP is no longer appropriate since nobody knows the 
specifications of a police station 15 years from now. National priorities and 
regulations are changing too fast. Consequently, long-term contracts are not 
adapted to the needs of the Ministry. For example, the space for people who 
are held in custody now has to be 7 square meters with toilets (instead of 6 
without toilets in 2000). Thus, the question is more about building flexibility 
than contract flexibility. 
Governance mechanisms 
The contract is not precise on several issues. In many cases the user does 
not know if he has to handle a problem or to ask the private owner (the 
consortium) or the operator. 
It seems that equity investors in this project have made large gains. This 
explains why they accepted to modify the financial clauses before the 
deadline written in the contract. Since private partners do not seem to lose 
money, they accept to provide services which are not contractual. 
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The performance process and the value to the end users 
The police station was not always well designed. This was due both to the 
difficulties of public authority to define its expectations and the lack of 
experience of the architect and the contractor with police station. Despite 
this situation and some malfunctions of equipment in operation, the occupant 
considers that the service quality is good. The maintenance and operation 
contract is not performance-based but the operator answers very fast to the 
needs of the occupants. Moreover, the owner is contractually forced to offer 
an operational building. This quality is also explained by the budget 
dedicated to maintenance and operation, which is more than three-times 
higher in Strasbourg than in other police stations located in the East of 
France (EUR 20 per square meter versus EUR 6). 
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Cross-cutting analysis and conclusion 
The construction industry is often criticized for its inability to innovate, to 
improve its practices and to provide value for its clients (Egan, 1998).  
 To fulfil the expectations of demanding clients, new project-delivery 
mechanisms have been developed. Approaches focusing on performance-
based building or new procurement processers such as new forms of 
private-public partnerships are considered as solutions improving the overall 
performance of the industry. 
 The main objective of this project was to understand how the 
development of integrated solutions in construction led to distinct 
configuration of actors and structures. Furthermore, the project analyses 
whether these changes modified project processes and contributed to the 
delivery of new value to the end users. 
 In this report we have argued that an understanding of the coupling 
between new values for clients and new project-delivery configurations can 
benefit from including the notation of CoPS to weight the systemic and 
contextual factors in which the formation and stabilization of the coupling 
between values and new project- delivery methods takes place. 
 The French and Danish cases represent six different types of delivery 
systems to deliver public goods. The cases are analysed and discussed in 
relation to three themes that public procurers need to be aware of when 
changing delivery system: innovation, governance and performance.  The 
next three sections discuss the experiences from the six cases in relation to 
each theme. For an overview of the differences and similarities between the 
different types of partnerships, see Table 4 and Table 5 below.  
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Type  ESCO Client partnership Supplier partnership 
Case  Frederiksberg Municipality UN CITY Green Lighthouse 
Innovation Project Refurbishment project and 
delivery of energy services  
Conventional project Traditional project 
demonstrating Danish energy-
solutions  
 Operational system Frederiksberg Municipality Complex University 
 Systems integrator ESCO partnership Developer Steering committee 
 Feedback mechanism  Guaranteed savings scheme 
and energy baseline  
Certification schemes EUDP project/stakeholder 
interest in performance 
 Type Organisational Organisational 
Product: Solar shading panels 
Products: Integration of energy 
solutions 
Governance  Policy processes Politicisation of industry 
business processes by setting 
objectives (MBO) 
Commodification of public 
politics (commercialisation) 
Politicisation of industry 
business processes 
 
 Business processes Medium-term  
<14 years 
Infinite, but with 15-25 years 
lease period 
 
Ad-hoc 
 Learning processes Establishing energy baseline 
and monitoring energy usage 
Applying international 
standards 
Energy regulation strategies & 
supplier knowledge 
 Contractual mechanisms Combining relational and 
transactional mechanisms: 
ABR 89, ABT 93, partnership 
agreement 
Transactional contracting: 
controlled design-build 
Strategic partnership and 
turnkey contract 
Performance  Society CO2 reductions and fulfilment of 
national energy target 
Support Copenhagen as a 
major UN location 
CO2 reductions, national 
business strategy and 
facilitation of a green campus 
 Operational system Cost neutrality 
Flagship project 
Attainment of guaranteed 
savings 
Profit – selling building rights 
Green Building certification 
Functioning energy solution s 
and energy savings 
Indoor climate 
User satisfaction 
 Project Conform to annual financial 
municipal allocations 
Profit 
Low-energy class 1 
LEED Platinum certificate 
 
Knowledge and experiences 
with integrated energy solutions 
in use 
Profit 
 Users Unchanged use 
Easy maintenance  
Increase knowledge exchange Inspiration 
Functioning energy solutions 
Table 4. Summary of Danish cases 
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Type  PPP ESPC PPP 
Case  INSEP 18 high schools  Strasbourg police station 
Innovation Project Renovation carried out under a 
public management contract 
Refurbishment with a strong 
focus on energy performance 
Construction of a building 
hosting 7 services. 
 Operational system Consortium of different 
stakeholders. 
The company which 
refurbished the high schools 
Separate contract for 
maintenance and operation 
 Systems integrator SPV SPV SPV + bilateral relationships 
between the client and the 
operator 
 Feedback mechanism  Key Performance Indicators  
Onsite helpdesk 
Centralised control station and 
KPI (mainly energy 
consumptions) 
Contract is not performance-
based 
 Type Process 
Organisational 
ESPC contract Financial and organisational 
Governance  Policy processes Educational and sport policy Environmental and educational 
policy 
Security policy 
 Business processes Long-term 
~30 years 
Medium-term  
15 years 
Long-term  
25 years 
 Learning processes International inspiration Monitoring energy usage Learn about private financing 
and facility management  
 Contractual mechanisms Primarily transactional  Primarily transactional however 
(relational at the level of each 
high school) 
Combining relational and 
transactional mechanisms: a 
lease contract and a formal 
contract indicating the rights of 
the occupant 
Performance 
goals 
Society International leadership in sport Reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions  
 
Centralisation of police services 
and improving security 
 Operational system Reduce energy consumption  
Raise the service quality 
Reduce energy bill and CO2 
emissions 
Better service quality 
 Project Modernise site  
Keep within budget 
LCC 
Different energy targets for 
different schools 
Renovation of 18 H Schools 
New police station  
 Users Better service quality Comfort temperature Better service quality   
Development of “design, build 
and operate” 
Table 5. Summary of French cases   
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Innovation 
The research on innovation in this study concerned how new configurations 
of partnerships in the construction sector occur as part of the innovation by 
the sector itself in its transition to social agendas such as energy and 
climate-adapted building etc. This addresses the issue on where and how 
different configurations of various public-private partnerships come into 
being in the construction sector, how new innovative structures are taken 
into use in construction projects and what types of feedback processes that 
have been established as part of the innovation (research question 1). 
 The boundary between each construction project and the institutional 
context in which each construction project is embedded is often somewhat 
blurred. There is a general lack of understanding of the impact of the 
institutional context on innovation, and project practices in general. By using 
a CoPS approach it is possible to deepen the understanding of how a 
construction project is not only subject to a certain institutional context, but it 
actively interprets and translates institutional challenges to problems to be 
solved, which in turn alters the institutional context. 
 The six cases were chosen because they initially had the potential to be a 
CoPS. In the analysis of the six cases, focus was therefore on both the 
project's development of new systems architecture and on the realization of 
feedback processes as a strategy to optimize the established system design. 
 The results from the six cases support Gann and Salter’s (2000) view that 
innovation not only should be understood in the light of what the individual 
construction project can deliver in terms of new innovative solutions within 
the framework of type of tender, building program, design and execution. 
Rather, the analysis stresses the point that in order to understand innovation 
in construction, it is relevant to understand the interplay between the 
institutional context and the individual construction project. 
 By focussing on the development of new systems architecture, this 
interplay is thematised and the six cases show how this interplay takes place 
in a phase before the tender phase in which new types of partnerships are 
established and the project content is defined; often by redefining 
established institutional norms for both partnerships and project content. At 
the same time the results suggest that feedback processes from the 
individual construction projects, which help to anchor the experience in 
future projects, are already pre-structured by precisely this seemingly 
invisible pre-phase. 
 The CoPS approach raises the question of complexity and focuses 
primarily on product complexity. One of the urgent institutional challenges in 
the construction industry is to transform the construction sector to provide for 
a building with focus on energy performance. Using a CoPs approach in the 
construction sector there is a need to include additional aspects in the 
understanding of complexity to meet both the sector’s challenges in shifting 
to focus on energy performance, and the construction sector’s specific 
interaction with society. 
 The case results indicates that the following dimensions of complexity 
appear in connection with the development of the systems architecture, 
where the institutional challenges are interpreted and translated into 
concrete practice in the construction project, i.e. the meeting between the 
institutional context and the actual construction project. 
– Technical complexity (integrating energy solutions) 
– Organizational complexity (new partnerships between private and public 
actors) 
– Process complexity (new types of contracts and performance goals) 
– User-complexity (new types of interactions with the use phase) 
– Service and operational complexity (long lifespan and involvement of new 
stakeholders) 
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The extent to which these dimensions of complexity occurs depends on the 
institutional challenges that are addressed in the given construction project, 
which in turn depends on which actors are the key actors in defining the 
project in the pre-stage. 
 The cases show that different types of partnerships between public and 
private partners can be systems integrators between the operational system 
and the construction project's realization of solutions. Management of the 
different complexity dimensions will be embedded in the partnerships, 
depending on which actors are involved in the partnerships. 
 Similarly, the character of the feedback processes taking place in the 
individual construction projects will be embedded in the given partnerships. 
Feedback processes cannot be understood in isolation, but need to be 
understood in the specific context they are embedded in. Therefore, there 
will be inner coherence between the project's complexity dimensions, the 
established partnership, the content / scope of the project and the project’s 
innovation focus. There must be actors who have an interest in creating 
feedback processes and take experience into use in their own context, 
otherwise the experiences remain unused and there is no optimization of the 
system design in the long term. 
 The experience gained from the analysis of the management of 
complexity dimensions and how new innovative structures are taken into use 
in construction projects and transform both the construction project and the 
operational system, points generally to the following: 
 
Technical complexity (integrating energy solutions) 
– Composition of technical systems must be considered.  
– It may be difficult to run-in technical solutions and a period of 
troubleshooting is needed. It may also be difficult for operating employees 
to take over the operation of complex technical systems, and this 
challenges the division of labour between the project and the operational 
system. 
– New types of alliances are established between suppliers of building 
components, suppliers of energy technology and technical consultants, all 
of whom have an interest in buildings’ energy performance in the use 
phase. This can exclude architects from the design phase. 
 
Organizational complexity (new partnerships between private and public 
actors) 
– New partnerships are established between private and public actors, 
which involve the development of new types of agreements between the 
parties. This may involve a change in the division of labour between 
traditional project-based organizations in the construction sector and the 
rest of the delivery system as well as new types of client systems. 
 
Process complexity (new types of contracts and performance goals) 
– New types of performance-based contracts require a high degree of 
flexibility, which challenges the parties’ confidence in each other. 
 
User-complexity (new types of interactions with the use phase) 
– It is difficult even through the involvement of users in the initial stages to 
predict the use of the buildings both in short term and long term. This 
creates uncertainty in the design phase. At the same time, this indicates 
that the value for the users can not only be built into the product (building 
and service) but the value for the users must also be seen as a process in 
which value is constantly being created in the actual use of the building. 
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Service and operational complexity (long lifespan and involvement of new 
stakeholders) 
Services are at the core of most PPP projects. Under this scheme public 
authorities do not buy any more a building but the services attached to a 
building. Moreover the long-term nature of the contracts could render them 
inflexible in the face of the inevitable uncertainty regarding future 
requirements over the long contract periods. Thus there is a necessity to find 
element of flexibility. In several occasions, trust and relational governance 
bring this flexibility and facilitate the enforcement of the contracts. 
 Overall, the experience demonstrates that the construction sector’s 
innovation is characterized by a continuous translation of societal demands, 
project-related requirements, requirements from the operational system and 
user requirements in the individual construction project, and that this 
translation is done in many places by many different actors in the 
construction sector. At the same time the cases show that management of 
the construction projects’ different dimensions of complexity and the built-in 
feedback processes are all central to the development of the construction 
sector. 
 The proposal for closer focus on the construction project’s pre-phase and 
feedback processes between pre-phase and traditional construction project 
phases as well as the use phase, is an alternative perspective to the view 
that innovation between projects and companies is about system integration 
through a simple driver, an alternative that instead focuses on the 
multifaceted innovation processes taking place, initiated by different actors, 
that all in different ways, contribute to the solution of complex problems in 
construction. 
Governance 
As stated in previous sections this study intends to analyse and categorise 
the processes and mechanisms, which govern the delivery of complex 
products and systems in construction (research question 2). More 
specifically, this study has taken the framework proposed by Gann & Salter 
(2000) as its starting point. This framework understands construction as a 
complex of supply networks, project-based firms and projects that are 
embedded in a context of regulation and knowledge production. 
 The linkages between the various elements in the model by Gann & 
Salter (2000) are perceived as knowledge flows. Undoubtedly, the links can 
be perceived partially as knowledge flows, but in an early analysis of two of 
the case studies Haugbølle et al. (2012) suggest an understanding of 
construction as a technological system and ask through which technologies 
the interactions between the various constituents of construction take place. 
Technology may be perceived as the sum of artefacts, processes and 
knowledge. Taking this early analysis one step further, the complete 
collection of case studies illustrates that the relations between the various 
actors are kept in place via a diversity of technologies. These include 
financial instruments like capital investments in the UN City; organisational 
arrangements like the Public-Private Partnerships of INSEP and police 
stations in France as well as the strategic partnerships with manufacturers in 
the case of Green Lighthouse; contractual arrangements like the ESCO 
contract of Frederiksberg Properties etc. 
 It also appears that the delivery of CoPS modifies the traditional 
relationship between buyer and supplier. Indeed the coordinator of the 
project has to manage networks including suppliers, designers, contractors, 
facility managers, financial institutions and government authorities. In PPP 
projects, the coordinator is the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which 
organises the division of tasks (design, construction, operation and finance) 
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among the partners of the SPV (Brady et al., 2005). The management of 
these complex interfaces is the key issue to deliver integrated solutions to 
clients and to create value for the end users. 
 Previous policy analyses of Danish construction as a cluster or a resource 
area (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 1993 and 2000) have adopted an 
understanding of the interactions as framed through three distinctively 
different, yet interrelated markets: 
– A product market between the supply network and the project-based 
firms. 
– A construction market between the project-based firms and the building 
owners. 
– A property market between building owners and users. 
 
Further, we would like to repeat the alternative perspective on the 
constituents of construction suggested in the early analysis of Haugbølle et 
al. (2012). This alternative perspective is illustrated below in Figure 30. More 
specifically, a clearer distinction between building owners on one hand and 
users on the other hand is introduced. In most cases, the building owner and 
users will be interacting through a property market either through a sales 
process or a lease contract.  
 
 
Figure 30. An alternative perspective on the construction system. Source: (Haugbølle et al. 2012: 452). 
The complete collection of case studies in this volume supports the early 
suggestion made by Haugbølle et al. (2012) that the dominant character of 
the interactions between actors is taking place through policy processes, 
business processes and learning processes. This is not to imply that all the 
processes are at play with the same weight in all situations or between all 
actors. Business processes seems to be particular important with regard to 
interactions in the business system of the supply network, the project-based 
firms, the building owners and the users since most of the products and 
services are being exchanged through the three types of markets mentioned 
above. The interaction between the regulatory and institutional framework on 
one hand and the business system and the technical support infrastructure 
on the other hand may be more dominated by policy processes of policy 
formulation and policy implementation. The interaction between the technical 
support infrastructure on one hand and the business system and the 
regulatory framework on the other hand may be dominated by learning 
processes related to education by educational institutions, the adoption and 
adaptation of knowledge from international centres and schemes like LEED, 
and the development and dissemination of new knowledge from research 
institutions and the like. 
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Performance 
In this section, we will summarise the main findings in relation to the third 
research question presented in the introduction, namely how the recent 
changes in procurement procedures towards public-private partnerships are 
reflected in specific performance management processes and the delivery of 
value to end users.  
 An interesting feature of the performance criteria and goals that have 
been identified in the four of the six cases and summarised in the above 
Table 4 and Table 5 is the relative absence of contradictions or divergence 
across the four different actor perspectives (society, operational system, 
project and users) that have been applied in the analyses. The different 
types of project-service delivery mechanisms that have been the focus of the 
case studies (i.e. supplier partnerships, PPPs, ESCO/ESPCs and client 
partnerships) seem to have been able to bridge and converge potentially 
conflicting perspectives and interests rather than aggravating these, as is 
often the case in traditional infrastructure projects (cf. Van de Riet, 2003; 
Olander and Landin, 2005).  
 A number of factors might have contributed to this; however in particular, 
the hybridisation of the contract, i.e. the employment of a combination of 
transactional and relational contractual mechanisms, might be seen as an 
explanation for this climate of conformity. Whereas transactional obligations 
are linked to economics exchange, relational obligations are concerned with 
social exchange (Shore and Tetrick, 1994). Another defining characteristic is 
that relational contracts focus on the contingent and reciprocal exchanges 
between partners, transaction contracts assumes that transactions between 
parties are independent events, i.e. that they are not long-term and ongoing 
(Shore and Tetrick, 1994: 95). 
 Turning our attention to the Danish cases, we see that each of these 
cases, with the exception of the UN City case, employ a combination of 
transactional and relational mechanisms that taken together constitute a 
governance frame that has been effectively able to handle the different, 
divergent targets of the stakeholders. Especially in the Danish ESCO case 
the distinct and tailored project-system setup, employing a broad range of 
economic, contractual and organizational mechanisms seem to have played 
a prominent role in ensuring that performance goals in different actor 
perspectives can be effectively met through a balanced and integrated 
network configuration. This has also been the case in the Green Lighthouse 
case where the strict focus on performance issues by all parties and the 
distinct translation of different performance goals into tangible energy 
solutions helped bridge the different actor perspectives present in the 
project.     
 The main lesson of these cases is in other words that it is possible to 
balance different actors’ goals and concerns by means of different 
procurement routes that represent integrated and situated responses or 
strategies to the handling of complex service deliveries. In particular, going 
from observing an isolated project to observing an integrated project-system 
network as the unit of governance help shift focus to understanding different 
actors’ equally legitimate aspirations and performance goals – and hence 
develop new responses and governance mechanisms that can facilitate 
better value not only for the client but for the whole spectrum of stakeholders 
involved in the procurement and operation of complex products and systems 
in construction.     
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General conclusions 
All cases illustrate how construction projects become more and more 
complex and require the development of new relationships between clients 
and providers of integrated solutions. This is due to: 
– The number of interdependencies among the stakeholders of the projects 
(users and companies in charge of construction and facility management). 
– The multiplicity of users with different requirements and the overlapping 
roles between the regulatory and the business systems (as in the case of 
the UN City). 
– The necessity to define ex-ante services and to propose key performance 
indicators which will be easy measured (cf. the INSEP case). 
– The uncertainties surrounding these projects which are unique. These 
uncertainties require flexibility in order to deal with all contingencies that 
were not anticipated at the bid stage. In such situation relational 
governance is considered as a complement to contracts. 
 
One of the aims of the case studies was also to explore whether the move 
towards integrated solution provision provide better value for the clients. The 
answer is not straightforward. 
 In the French cases, the service quality is higher than in the past. 
Conversely the link between the project execution and the service delivery is 
still far from being perfect. It also appears that the level of requirements of 
the public user has increased, as it did not have the same level of 
expectation when the service was done by internal staff. 
 In the Danish cases, the short-term benefits seem evident in the ESCO 
case at least, where the municipality will have its building stock energy 
refurbished in a cost-neutral way – and at the same time contribute to 
national energy targets. Also the Green Lighthouse and the UN CITY cases 
illustrate how the distinct configuration of public and private clients and 
suppliers has led to the fulfilment of performance goals on many levels thus 
providing value for the client. On the other hand, the Danish projects are still 
in their early phases of operation, and as in the French cases, the link 
between the project execution and the service delivery is not optimal, as the 
Green Lighthouse case illustrates most prominently, where the energy 
consumption was found to be much higher than expected in the first year in 
operation. However, the subsequent efforts to successfully reduce energy 
consumption illustrate the strength of the close client-supplier partnership.   
 To fully understand the move towards enhanced performance and 
increased complexity in construction, more research is required. Indeed 
there is a need to analyse how the very delivery of integrated solutions 
combining building and operation can contribute to the reduction of energy 
consumption in buildings. 
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To fulfil the expectations of demanding clients, new 
project-delivery mechanisms have been develo-
ped. Approaches focusing on performance-based 
building or new procurement processers such 
as new forms of private-public partnerships are 
considered as solutions improving the overall per-
formance of the industry. The main objective of this 
project was to understand how the development of 
integrated solutions in construction led to distinct 
configuration of actors and structures. Further-
more, the project analyses whether these changes 
modified project processes and contributed to the 
delivery of new value to the end users. This report 
summarises the results from work undertaken in 
the international collaborative project “Procuring 
and Operating Complex Products and Systems 
in Construction” (POCOPSC). POCOPSC was car-
ried out in the period 2010-2014. The project was 
executed in collaboration between CSTB (Centre 
Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment) and SBi/AAU 
(the Danish Building Research Institute/Aalborg 
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